The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in CONTINENTAL INSURANCE v. FEDERAL EXPRESS, No. 03-57162, a federal appeal. The panel consisted of Procter Hug, Jr., Harry Pregerson, and Richard R. Clifton, Circuit Judges.

HUG, Circuit Judge:
This appeal is from a stipulated judgment for $109,023.24 in favor of Continental Insurance Company (”Continental”) for goods lost in shipment by Federal Express Corporation (”FedEx”). We have jurisdiction because the parties reserved the right to appeal the district court’s rulings on the applicability of the Original Warsaw Convention and its subsequent amending agreements, the Hague Protocol and the Montreal Protocol No. 4. I. BACKGROUND On March 31 and April 15, 1999, FedEx and Comet Electronics Co., Ltd., entered into a contract of carriage, whereby FedEx agreed to ship by air packages containing integrated circuits and memory modules from Hong Kong to Pasadena, . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an en banc opinion in USA v. VIDAL, No. 04-50185, a criminal appeal. The panel consisted of SCHROEDER, Chief Judge.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in DAVEL COMMUNICATIONS v. QWEST CORPORATION, No. 04-35677, a federal appeal. The panel consisted of Ronald M. Gould and Marsha S. Berzon, Circuit Judges, and William W Schwarzer, District Judge.

BERZON, Circuit Judge:
The Federal Telecommunications Act of 1996 (”1996 Act”) largely deregulated the telecommunications industry. At the same time, the 1996 Act continued to regulate certain segments of the industry so as to increase competition overall. For example, to promote more competitive market conditions, the 1996 Act required incumbent local exchange carriers, . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an amended order in BOYD v. NEWLAND, No. 03-17098, a habeas corpus appeal. The panel consisted of Richard D. Cudahy, Susan P. Graber, and Raymond C. Fisher, Circuit Judges.

GRABER, Circuit Judge:
The California courts denied a Batson motion made by Petitioner Mobassa Boyd and denied his request for a free transcript of the entire voir dire for use on appeal. We must ask whether those rulings were contrary to, or unreasonably applied, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. In an earlier decision in this case, we answered “no.” Boyd v. Newland, 393 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2004). In response to a petition for rehearing and in light of recent Supreme Court cases clarifying Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), we conclude that our earlier analysis was flawed. We now hold that the California appellate courts violated clearly established federal law by denying Petitioner’s habeas petition because, without an entire voir dire transcript, those courts could not evaluate the relevant circumstances surrounding the contested strike, as Batson requires. In that respect we reverse and remand with instructions to grant the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner also argues that the California courts erred by enhancing his sentence because of a nonjury juvenile adjudication. As in our earlier decision, we disagree and, in this respect, affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Petitioner Mobassa Boyd is African-American. He was charged in California with unlawfully possessing a firearm after having previously suffered a juvenile adjudication for a felony, Cal. Penal Code § 12021(e), and with unlawfully possessing a sawed-off shotgun, id. § 12020(a)(1). . . .

The Opinion filed on December 29, 2004, slip op. at 17513, and appearing at 393 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2004), is amended. The Amended Opinion will be filed contemporaneously with this Order. With this amendment, the panel has voted to deny the petition for rehearing and petition for rehearing en banc. Judges Graber and Fisher have voted to deny the petition for rehearing en banc and Judge Cudahy has so recommended. The full court has been advised of the petition for rehearing en banc and no judge of the court has requested a vote on it. The petition for rehearing and petition for rehearing en banc are DENIED. Further petitions for rehearing or petitions for rehearing en banc may be filed. . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in USA v. STAFFELDT, No. 05-10243, a criminal appeal. The panel consisted of Stephen Reinhardt, John T. Noonan, and Michael Daly Hawkins, Circuit Judges.

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge:
The United States appeals an order of the district court granting a motion to suppress evidence obtained by means of a wiretap of two cellular phones belonging to Jeremy Staffeldt, one of the defendants. The district court found that the wiretap application was “facially insufficient,” one of the three grounds for suppressing evidence under the statute governing the authorization of wiretaps, Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (”Act”). The application, which sought an order to wiretap Staffeldt’s phones, included as an exhibit a memorandum of authorization from the Department of Justice (”DOJ” or “Justice Department”) that purportedly showed that the request to submit the application to wiretap Staffeldt had been approved by a properly authorized DOJ official, as required by the Act. Unfortunately, however, the memorandum of authorization did no such thing. Instead, it pertained to an entirely unrelated wiretap. It authorized the submission of an application for a wiretap of a different person, with a different phone number, address, cell phone issuer, and mobile subscriber identity number, than those belonging to Staffeldt or any of the defendants in this case. In fact, it referred to an entirely different criminal investigation in a different state in a different part of the country. Most important, the memorandum of authorization did not, directly or indirectly, refer to Staffeldt or his codefendants in any regard. Despite this flagrant and obvious error on the face of the wiretap application — we have held the attachment to be a part of the application — the government argues that the eviIn United States v. Callum, 410 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2005), we explained that when a DOJ memorandum of authorization for a wiretap request is presented to a judge reviewing a wiretap application, that memorandum is part of the application. Id. at 576. . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in CISNEROS-PEREZ v. GONZALES, No. 04-71717, a federal appeal. The panel consisted of David R. Thompson, Marsha S. Berzon, and Consuelo M. Callahan, Circuit Judges.

BERZON, Circuit Judge:
Pedro Luis Cisneros-Perez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming a decision of an Immigration Judge (IJ) finding that he was ineligible for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). The IJ determined, under the “modified” categorical approach, that Cisneros-Perez’s 2001 conviction for battery under California Penal Code section 242 was a “crime of domestic violence” within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) and that he was therefore ineligible for cancellation of removal under § 1229b(b)(1)(C). We hold that there is insufficient documentation to establish that Cisneros-Perez’s prior conviction necessarily was a crime of domestic violence. We therefore grant his petition for review and remand to the agency for further proceedings. I. Background Cisneros-Perez entered the United States without inspec. . .

CALLAHAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
I agree with the majority that this case does not concern whether Cisneros-Perez’s conviction was a crime of moral turpitude, and that he has waived the argument that battery is not a crime of violence. I also agree with my colleagues that in order to determine whether Cisneros-Perez’s prior conviction constitutes a crime of domestic violence we use the categorical and modified categorical approach set forth in Taylor . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in USA v. JERNIGAN, No. 05-10086, a criminal appeal. The panel consisted of Betty B. Fletcher, David R. Thompson, and Carlos T. Bea, Circuit Judges.

THOMPSON, Senior Circuit Judge:
Defendant Rachel Alaffa Jernigan appeals the district court’s denial of her motion for a new trial. A jury convicted Jernigan on March 23, 2001, of having robbed a bank on September 20, 2000. After her conviction, Jernigan learned that someone with similar physical characteristics had robbed nearby banks in November of 2000 and December of 2001. Based on this information, Jernigan filed a motion for a new trial in which she asserted that (1) the government violated her due process rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 . . .

B. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in the majority’s holding regarding Rule 33 but respectfully dissent from its ruling under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). I Jernigan was initially charged with three robberies — a September 20, 2000 robbery at 15 East Guadalupe in Gilbert; an October 11, 2000 robbery at 906 East Baseline Road in Tempe; and an October 25, 2000 robbery at 2298 North Alma School in Chandler. After Jernigan was placed into custody, two more banks were robbed in close proximity to the 15 East Guadalupe branch, by a person matching Jernigan’s physical description — a short, Hispanic woman with acne. Those robberies took place on November 28, 2000 and November 30, 2000. I find it highly unlikely that in a case like this, which turns exclusively and entirely upon eyewitness testimony, the jury would have convicted Jernigan had it known that robberies at. . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in RITCHIE v. USA, No. 05-16401, an appeal in a civil action against the United States. The panel consisted of Betty B. Fletcher, Alex Kozinski and Raymond C. Fisher, Circuit Judges.

KOZINSKI, Circuit Judge:
We consider what inferences a district judge may draw, during a bench trial, in deciding a motion for judgment based on partial findings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(c). Facts On December 20, 1957, Wayne Ritchie, then a Deputy United States Marshal, attended a lunch-time Christmas party at the United States Post Office Building in San Francisco. Ritchie drank a bourbon and soda, and then returned to his desk. Later that afternoon, with the party now in full swing, Ritchie took a break to down three or four more bourbon and sodas. When he returned to his office, he began to feel paranoid and worthless. Ritchie left work early and went home. There, an unpleasant conversation with his live-in girlfriend from New York, who complained about living in San Francisco, drove him to leave the apartment in favor of the Vagabond Bar. He drank two more bourbon and sodas; his feelings of restlessness and paranoia continued. After about half an hour, he left the bar. . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in ANDERSON v. WARNER, No. 04-15505, a civil rights appeal. The panel consisted of Sidney R. Thomas and William A. Fletcher, Circuit Judges, and James C. Mahan, District Judge.

W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge:
In this § 1983 suit, Thomas Anderson appeals from the district court’s grant of summary judgment to individual defendant Charles Warner, as well as defendants Mendocino County Sheriff’s Office and County of Mendocino (collectively “the County”). Anderson contends that Warner assaulted him while acting under color of state law. Anderson also contends that the County negligently hired and supervised Warner, and conducted an inadequate investigation into the assault by Warner. We reverse as to Warner and affirm as to the County. I. Background On the morning of July 30, 2001, Anderson and Warner were slowly driving their own vehicles toward the Redwood Valley Parade. Anderson was momentarily distracted and accidentally rear-ended Warner’s vintage pickup truck. Warner got out of his truck, went back to Anderson’s vehicle, opened Anderson’s door, and began hitting Anderson in the face and neck. Warner’s wife, who had been a passenger, also got out of the truck. A probation officer and friend of Warner, Thomas Cropp, was driving the vehicle in front of Warner. Cropp got out of his vehicle and came back to join Warner and his wife. At the time of the assault, Warner was employed by the Mendocino County Sheriff’s Department as the jail commander. On the day of the assault, Warner was off duty and out of uniform. . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in EPI v. UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE, No. 04-15931, an appeal in a civil action against the United States. The panel consisted of J. Clifford Wallace, Michael Daly Hawkins, and Sidney R. Thomas, Circuit Judges.

HAWKINS, Circuit Judge:
The Environmental Protection Information Center (”EPIC”) appeals from the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the United States Forest Service (”USFS”). EPIC challenges USFS’s failure to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (”EIS”) in connection with the proposed Knob Timber Sale in the Klamath National Forest and further argues that the Environmental Assessment (”EA”) USFS did prepare was inadequate. EPIC also contends that the project violates the National Forest Management Act (”NFMA”). We affirm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY The Knob Timber Sale (the “Project”) is a vegetation management project affecting the Salmon River Ranger District of . . .