The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in USA v. ARELLANO-OCHOA, No. 04-30545, a criminal appeal. The panel consisted of Andrew J. Kleinfeld, Susan P. Graber, and Carlos T. Bea, Circuit Judges.

KLEINFELD, Circuit Judge:
We publish to clarify Fourth Amendment law regarding the police opening a screen door without a search warrant. We also speak to dismissal without prejudice for a speedy trial violation. FACTS Wyoming police caught an illegal alien headed to Arizona with $15,000 cash in the car. The car was registered to Daniel Priego of 640 Birch Lane, Billings, Montana. The driver, an illegal alien, claimed that he had been hired to drive the car to Arizona, deliver it to a woman who was going to “do something” with it, and then drive it to Montana and deliver it to the address on the car registration. He also said that there was an illegal alien at the Montana address. The police called U.S. Border Patrol in Montana to tell them that there was probably an illegal alien at the address at which the car was registered. . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in USA v. COVIAN-SANDOVAL, No. 05-50543, a criminal appeal. The panel consisted of Dorothy W. Nelson, Michael Daly Hawkins, and Richard A. Paez, Circuit Judges.

D.W. NELSON, Senior Circuit Judge:
Jose Covian-Sandoval (”Covian”) appeals his conviction and sentence for attempted illegal entry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Covian contends that the district court’s plea colloquy was inadequate under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 (”Rule 11″), and that the district court’s enhancement of Covian’s sentence violated Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Because we conclude that any such errors do not warrant relief under the plain error standard of review, we affirm. . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in SASS v. CALIFORNIA BOARD OF PRISON, No. 05-16455, a habeas corpus appeal. The panel consisted of Alfred T. Goodwin, Stephen Reinhardt, and Michael Daly Hawkins, Circuit Judges.

GOODWIN, Circuit Judge:
California state prisoner Brian Sass appeals the district court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Sass argues that the California Board of Prison Terms’ decisions, in 1999 and 2000, denying him parole violated his due process rights. We hold that California inmates continue to have a liberty interest in parole after In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061 (2005). However, the state court decisions upholding Sass’ parole denials were not contrary to, and did not involve an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. For this reason, we affirm. I. . . .

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
I am compelled to dissent from the majority’s refusal to grant relief to a person whose continued incarceration “runs contrary to the rehabilitative goals espoused by the prison system and could result in a due process violation,” Maj. Op. at 10573 (quoting Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 917 (9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added)) — a person who is currently entitled to relief under any rational application of the law. The majority offers no reasoned explanation for this refusal, no doubt because its decision to deny relief finds no support in either law or logic. Before I explain why the majority’s decision is erroneous, it may be helpful if I set forth the nature of Brian Sass’s offense and briefly identify the rules governing the California Parole Board’s authority to grant or deny eligibility for parole in such cases. Sass was convicted of second degree murder as the result of a death he caused while driving under the influence of alcohol in July of 1987, and he was sentenced to fifteen years to life in prison. After years of extensive and. . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in CHEMICAL PRODUCERS v. SYNGENTA CROP, No. 04-56318, a federal appeal. The panel consisted of Michael Daly Hawkins and Richard A. Paez, Circuit Judges, and Neil V. Wake, District Judge.

WAKE, District Judge:
We must decide whether intervening amendments to California’s pesticide registration laws, which were challenged and upheld below, render this appeal moot. We hold they do. Because the amendments cannot be attributed to the voluntary conduct of the party seeking relief from the judgment, we vacate the district court’s judgment. I. Federal and California Pesticide Regulation Under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136 to 136y (”FIFRA”), all pesticides must be registered with the Environmental Protection Agency before being sold or distributed. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a). Pesticides also must be registered with California’s Department of Pesticide Regulation (”the Department”) to be sold in California. Cal. Food & Agric. Code § 12811 (Deering 2006). Both the California and federal registration laws require prospective sellers to submit with their registration applications extensive data on the health and environmental effects of their pesticides. Because the testing required to produce such data is costly, applicants seeking to register pesticides with the same active ingredients as previously registered pesticides have incentive to acquire and use data submitted by prior registrants. FIFRA’s rules relating to re-use of data by secondary registration applicants fall into time periods beginning on the date the data were originally submitted. Original registrants are entitled to exclusive control over the data submitted with their application for ten years following their registration. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(F)(i). During the ten-year period, secondary registrants may use such data only if they obtain written consent from the original registrant, i.e., a “letter of authorization.” The exclusive control afforded to original registrants during . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an amended order in USA v. STATEB, No. 05-30055, a criminal appeal. The panel consisted of Ronald M. Gould and Marsha S. Berzon, Circuit Judges, and William W Schwarzer, District Judge.

BERZON, Circuit Judge:
United States v. Booker held that although district courts are no longer required to follow the United States Sentencing Guidelines (”Guidelines”), when making sentencing decisions, “the [Sentencing Reform] Act nonetheless requires judges to take account of the Guidelines together with other sentencing goals.” 543 U.S. 220, 259 (2005) (citing 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (Supp. 2004)); see also United States v. Cantrell, 433 F.3d 1269, 1278 (9th Cir. 2006) . . .

The opinion filed June 7, 2006, slip. op. 6211, and published at 450 F.3d 384 (9th Cir. 2006) is hereby amended as follows:
1. At slip op. 6227, delete from “There is an additional reason . . . .” through to the end of Part III of the opinion. 2. Replace deleted text with Section C in the attached amended opinion, starting with the language “There is an additional reason . . . .” through to “. . . . as determined in accord with existing case law, the enhancement must be supported by facts established by clear and convincing evidence.” No petitions for rehearing will be entertained. OPINION BERZON, Circuit Judge:
United States v. Booker held that although district courts are no longer required to follow the United States Sentencing Guidelines (”Guidelines”), when making sentencing decisions, “the [Sentencing Reform] Act nonetheless requires judges to take account of the Guidelines together with other sentencing goals.” 543 U.S. 220, 259 (2005) (citing 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (Supp. 2004)); see also United States v. Cantrell, 433 F.3d 1269, 1278 (9th Cir. 2006) . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in SYVERSON v. IBM, No. 04-16449, a federal appeal. The panel consisted of Marsha S. Berzon, Johnnie B. Rawlinson, and Consuelo M. Callahan, Circuit Judges.

BERZON, Circuit Judge:
Under the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act (”OWBPA”), employees may not waive rights or claims arising under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (”ADEA”) unless the waiver is “knowing and voluntary.” 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1) (2000). To qualify as “knowing and voluntary,” a waiver included in an agreement between an employer and its employees must, among other things, be “written in a manner calculated to be understood” by the average employee eligible to participate in the agreement. Id. § 626(f)(1)(A). This appeal presents the question whether a waiver form used by International Business Machines Corp. (”IBM”) in connection with a severance benefit package meets that standard. We hold that it does not and was therefore not “knowing and voluntary.” Id. § 626(f)(1). I. In January 2001, IBM began a reduction in its workforce. As part of its workforce reduction plan, IBM offered each employee selected for termination severance pay and certain benefits in exchange for signing a document entitled “Microelectronics Resource Action (MERA) General Release and Covenant Not To Sue” (”MERA Agreement”). Along with the MERA Agreement, IBM issued each selected employee a lengthy document entitled “Microelectronics Division Resource Action Employee Information Package” (”Information Package”), which details the job titles, ages, and numbers of those employees selected and those not selected for termination from various IBM divisions. . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an order in PUC OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA v. FERC, No. 01-71051, an administrative appeal. The panel consisted of THOMAS, Circuit Judge An amended opinion has been filed contemporaneously with this Order. The amended opinion was filed in response to requests for correction of certain portions of the factual recitation of the case. Objections were filed to some of the requests on the basis that the proposed amendments would affect the substance of the prior opinion. After examining the requests, the panel agreed that some amendments were appropriate to correct the factual record and prevent subsequent misinterpretation of portions of the prior opinion. Therefore, rather than defer the requests until consideration of petitions for rehearing, we believed that some corrections should be made promptly. The panel has deferred taking action on some of the other requests until it considers any petitions for rehearing. In sum, the amended opinion does not contain any changes to the substance of the holdings. It only contains corrections to the factual record and a few other technical corrections. Given that, the previous orders pertaining to the time for filing petitions for rehearing remain in effect, unaltered by the filing of the amended opinion. However, the petitions should reference the corrected amended opinion filed today, rather than the original opinion.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in PUC OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA v. FERC, No. 01-71051, an administrative appeal. The panel consisted of THOMAS, McKEOWN, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in TRUSTEES OF THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY AND LABORERS HEALTH AND WELFARE TRUST v. REDLAND INSURANCE COMPANY, No. 04-16380, a federal appeal. The panel consisted of Pamela Ann Rymer, William A. Fletcher, and Richard R. Clifton, Circuit Judges.

W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiffs/Appellants (”the Joint Trustees”) prevailed in an action to collect delinquent benefit contributions owed to trusts established under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (”ERISA”). The Joint Trustees then sought an award of “reasonable attorney’s fees and costs of the action” under ERISA pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)(D). The district court granted some of the requested fees, but it refused to allow any recovery for work performed by non-attorneys such as law clerks and paralegals. It also refused to allow any recovery for expenses incurred in the course of the litigation. The Joint Trustees appeal the district court’s refusal to award these fees. We reverse and remand. I. Background On February 12, 2004, the district court granted the Joint Trustees’ motion for summary judgment under 29 U.S.C. § 1145 for unpaid benefit contributions on behalf of non. . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in FUNKY FILMS, INC. v. TIME WARNER ENTERTAINMENT, No. 04-55578, a federal appeal. The panel consisted of Betty B. Fletcher, Warren J. Ferguson, and Consuelo M. Callahan, Circuit Judges.

B. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge: Gwen O’Donnell and Funky Films, Inc. (collectively, “appellants”), creators of the screenplay “The Funk Parlor,” appeal the district court’s summary judgment to Time Warner Entertainment Company and Home Box Office (collectively, “HBO”), creators of the award-winning television mini-series “Six Feet Under,” for copyright infringement. Appellants assert that the district court erred in concluding that “The Funk Parlor” and “Six Feet Under” are not substantially similar. They also appeal the district court’s denial of a request for additional discovery. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the district court. . . .