The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in ALLEN v. GOLD COUNTRY CASINO, No. 05-15332, a federal appeal. The panel consisted of William C. Canby, Jr., David R. Thompson, and Michael Daly Hawkins, Circuit Judges.

CANBY, Circuit Judge:
Mark Allen is a former employee of the Gold Country Casino, which is owned and operated by the Tyme Maidu Tribe of the Berry Creek Rancheria in California. After the Casino fired Allen, he sued it and the Tribe. The district court dismissed the claims against the Tribe and the Casino on the ground of sovereign immunity. Allen concedes the Tribe’s immunity, but argues that the district court erred in extending that immunity to the Casino without scrutinizing the relationship between the Tribe and the Casino. We find no error in the district court’s dismissal of Allen’s claims against the Casino because the record and the law establish sufficiently that it functions as an arm of the Tribe. Allen also asserted various claims against Mattie Mayhew, a tribal member, and John Doe defendants. We reverse in part the district court’s dismissal of these claims and remand for consideration of Allen’s claims under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1985, along with any state law claims over which the district court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction. I. Facts Allen was employed by Gold Country Casino as a surveillance supervisor. Gold Country Casino is a tribal entity formed by a compact between the federally recognized Tyme Maidu Tribe and the State of California. The Casino is wholly owned and operated by the Tribe. Allen contends he was discharged in retaliation for reporting rats in the Casino’s restaurant and for applying to “the white man’s court” for guardianship of three tribal children. Allen obtained a right to sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and, proceeding pro se, filed this action in federal district court. Allen named as defendants . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an order and opinion in PARK v. ANAHEIM UNION HIGH, No. 04-55569, a federal appeal. The panel consisted of Robert R. Beezer, Cynthia Holcomb Hall, and Kim McLane Wardlaw, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:
Joseph Park (”Joseph”) and his mother, Kyung Hee Park, bring this action against the Anaheim Union High School District (”District”) and the Greater Anaheim Special Education Local Plan Area. The complaint alleges that defendants have failed to comply with procedural and substantive requirements of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. The Parks expressly challenge the award of compensatory services and the denial of attorney’s fees. The district court affirmed the decisions of the Hearing Officer of the California Special Education Hearing Office in part and modified minor details in part. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm in part and reverse in part and remand for a determination of attorney’s fees. I Joseph was born in 1990 with a genetic defect known as cri du chat, cry of the cat, or 5p-syndrome. Deficits attributed to his disability include developmental delay, deficient cognitive ability, poor muscle tone, speech and language delay, gross and fine motor delay, difficulty in muscle training and coordination, difficulty assimilating toilet training, self-care difficulty, drooling and behavioral difficulties. Joseph has below average cognitive ability; his I.Q. is below 70. His family’s primary language is Korean. Joseph entered the Greater Anaheim public school district as a special day class student at age three. He attended Salk. . .

The panel has voted to GRANT appellant’s petition for rehearing and to REJECT the suggestion for rehearing en banc. The full court has been advised of the suggestion for rehearing en banc and no active judge has requested a vote on whether to rehear the matter en banc. Fed. R. App. P. 35. The petition for rehearing is granted and the suggestion for rehearing en banc is rejected. The opinion and dissent, filed on April 17, 2006, are hereby VACATED and REPLACED by the per curiam opinion and concurrence filed on September 28, 2006. No subsequent petitions for rehearing or rehearing en banc shall be filed. IT IS SO ORDERED. . . .

BEEZER, Circuit Judge, concurring:
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act provides that “[i]n any proceeding brought under this section, the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the costs to the parents of a child with a disability who is the prevailing party.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). In accorThe cited language is that of the statute in force at the time period in dispute (2001-2002). The language of the current attorneys’ fee provision is almost identical. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an en banc order in ODOM v. MICROSOFT, No. 04-35468, a federal appeal. The panel consisted of SCHROEDER, Chief Judge.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in HOSSEINI v. GONZALES, No. 03-73734, an administrative appeal. The panel consisted of William C. Canby, Jr., Ronald M. Gould, and Carlos T. Bea, Circuit Judges.

CANBY, Circuit Judge:
Masoud Hosseini is an Iranian citizen who came to the United States on a student visa. He did not attend school and he overstayed his visa. He was ordered deported as an overstay, but he subsequently succeeded in having his deportation proceeding reopened. He sought asylum, withholding of deportation, and adjustment of status under the Immigration and Nationality Act (”INA”). He also sought withholding and deferral of deportation under the Convention Against Torture. An immigration judge denied Hosseini all relief under the INA primarily because of his connection and activities with the Iranian dissident group Mujahedin-e Khalq (”MEK”),1 designated by the Secretary of State as a terrorist organization. The immigration judge also denied relief under the Convention Against Torture on the ground that Hosseini had failed to show that it was more likely than not that he would be tortured if deported to Iran. The Board of Immigration Appeals (”BIA”) dismissed Hosseini’s appeal, upholding the immigration judge’s rulings.2 The BIA stated alternatively that it denied asylum as a matter of discretion because of Hosseini’s immigration fraud. It also affirmed the denial of adjustment of status on the ground of inadmissibility, but in addition denied adjustment as an exercise of discretion, because of Hosseini’s terrorist-connected activities and his fraud. The BIA also stated that Hosseini’s terrorist-related activities precluded withholding of deportation not only under the INA, but also under the Convention Against Torture. Hosseini now petitions for review. . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in HUYNH v. CHASE MANHATTAN BANK, No. 04-56105, a federal appeal. The panel consisted of Dorothy W. Nelson and Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Circuit Judges, and Robert C. Jones, District Judge.

D.W. NELSON, Senior Circuit Judge:
Proposed class representatives of Vietnamese bank depositors seek to recover the dollar value of bank deposits made in Saigon, South Vietnam, before April 1975. On appeal, they challenge the district court’s orders dismissing as time-barred their complaint against Citibank, N.A. (Citibank), The Chase Manhattan Bank (Chase), and Chiao Tung Bank (Chiao Tung). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm, discussing many of the heretofore unaddressed issues raised by this case. I After several years of conflict, Saigon, the capital of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam), was surrendered . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an order and opinion in EDUCATIONAL CREDIT MANAGEMENT CORPORATION v. MASON, No. 04-35988, a bankruptcy appeal. The panel consisted of David R. Thompson, A. Wallace Tashima, and Consuelo M. Callahan, Circuit Judges.

TASHIMA, Circuit Judge:
Educational Credit Management Corporation (”ECMC”) appeals from the decision of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (”BAP”), which affirmed the bankruptcy court’s partial discharge of government-insured student loans held by DebtorAppellee Keith Mason (”Mason”). See Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Mason (In re Mason), 315 B.R. 554 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2004). The bankruptcy court held that full repayment of the loans would cause Mason an undue hardship within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). It therefore discharged all amounts that Mason owed to ECMC in excess of $32,400.1 The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b). The BAP had jurisdiction under § 158(c). We have jurisdiction under § 158(d), and we reverse. BACKGROUND At the time of the bankruptcy adversary proceeding, Mason was 33 years old, single, in good physical health, and had no dependents. Mason is well-educated, having earned an undergraduate degree in philosophy from Boise State University in 1995, and a law degree from Gonzaga University in 1999. Mason financed his education by acquiring federally-insured student loans from various lenders totaling approximately $193,000 in principal and accrued interest. At issue in this proceeding is approximately $100,000 owed to ECMC in its capacity as successor-in-interest to Northwest Education Loan Association. . . .

Appellant’s unopposed request for publication is granted. The mandate issued on July 26, 2006, is recalled and the memorandum disposition filed on June 29, 2006, 2006 WL 1876890, is withdrawn, and replaced by the authored opinion filed concurrently with this order. No further petitions for rehearing may be filed. . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in PURI v. GONZALES, No. 05-36182, an administrative appeal. The panel consisted of David R. Thompson, A. Wallace Tashima, and Consuelo M. Callahan, Circuit Judges.

TASHIMA, Circuit Judge:
Dewan Puri (”Puri”), a native and citizen of India, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus (his second) in the district court, challenging a January 15, 1997, order of deportation, which ordered Puri deported to India. The district court dismissed Puri’s petition for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to the REAL ID Act and Puri filed a timely notice of appeal. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a), and we affirm. We review de novo a district court’s decision to dismiss a habeas corpus petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Taniguchi v. Schultz, 303 F.3d 950, 955 (9th Cir. 2002). I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY Puri lawfully entered the United States with an immigrant visa in 1984. He is married to a United States citizen and has two United States citizen children. Following convictions for child molestation and indecent liberties, Puri was placed in. . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an amended order in HYDRICK v. HUNTER, No. 03-56712, a prisoner appeal. The panel consisted of Mary M. Schroeder, Chief Judge, Harry Pregerson and Stephen S. Trott, Circuit Judges.

PREGERSON, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiffs-Appellees represent a class of approximately 600 civilly committed persons and those awaiting commitment at Atascadero State Hospital pursuant to California’s Sexually Violent Predators Act (”SVP Act”). In this suit, Plaintiffs allege that the conditions of their confinement violate their constitutional rights. They request declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as monetary damages. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss based largely on qualified immunity, but their motion was summarily denied by the district court. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm in part, and reverse in part. FACTUAL BACKGROUND1 1. California’s Sexually Violent Predators Scheme The SVP Act defines an SVP as a person “convicted of a sexually violent offense against two or more victims for which he or she received a determinate sentence and who has a diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others” i.e., is “likely [to] engage in sexually violent criminal behavior.” See Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6600(a). At least six months before a person who has committed the predicate offenses is to complete his sentence, he is evaluated by the Department of Corrections and Department of Mental Health. Id. § 6601. If those two departments agree that the person evaluated may be an SVP, a petition for commitment may be filed by the district attorney or counsel. . .

The concurrence/dissent filed June 1, 2006, is hereby amended. The clerk shall filed the attached amended concurrence/dissent. . . .

TROTT, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I My disagreement with my colleagues is limited to one critical issue. We agree that plaintiffs cannot seek damages in this lawsuit against state officials in their official capacities, and that plaintiffs cannot seek damages from the State either. So, what is left where the officials are concerned? A lawsuit against them personally for acts and omissions alleged to have been taken in the discharge of their official duties. This is a mistake, and it is here that I part company. On this record, and under these circumstances, I conclude, with all respect to my colleagues, that these officials as individuals are clearly entitled to qualified immunity against both suit and damages — now, not later. In my view, the particulars and the contours of the alleged constitutional rights upon which the plaintiffs rely were not so clearly established at the times under scrutiny and at the level of specificity required such that a reasonable official hired by the state to cope pursuant to statutory authority with lawfully confined sexually violent predators subject to remedial treatment would have been aware that the conduct alleged violated federal constitutional bounds. Given the unsettled nature of the law in this area, a reasonable official could certainly have believed otherwise. We decide this appeal with clear analytical guidance from the Supreme Court:
Somewhat more concretely, whether an official protected by qualified immunity may be held personally . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in USA v. BAZA-MARTINEZ, No. 05-10282, a criminal appeal. The panel consisted of Betty B. Fletcher, Robert R. Beezer, and Raymond C. Fisher, Circuit Judges.

B. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge:
I. Ruben Baza-Martinez appeals his seventy-month sentence, following his guilty plea to illegal re-entry after deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. We remand for resentencing. Baza-Martinez contends that the imposition of a sixteenlevel sentencing enhancement was not justified because his prior felony conviction under North Carolina General Statute (N.C.G.S.) § 14-202.1, for taking indecent liberties with a child, is not “sexual abuse of a minor,” a “crime of violence” under United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). Baza-Martinez also challenges the district court’s decisions not to grant his requests for a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility and for a downward departure based on cultural assimilation. The record contains no documents that reveal the specifics of Baza-Martinez’s conduct. As we are unable to undertake the modified categorical approach, we decide this case using . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in GRANADOS-OSEGURA v. GONZALES, No. 03-73030, an administrative appeal. The panel consisted of Betty B. Fletcher, A. Wallace Tashima, and Consuelo M. Callahan, Circuit Judges.

B. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge:
I. Mariano Granados-Oseguera petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA’s) affirmance of an Immigration Judge’s (IJ’s) denial of cancellation of removal as well as the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen proceedings to allow him to apply for adjustment of status. We deny Granados-Oseguera’s petition as to his equal protection claim based on a claim of disparate treatment of different classes of aliens; it does not violate Petitioner’s equal protection rights to treat aliens permitted voluntarily to depart differently from aliens not eligible for voluntary departure with respect to the amount of time in which they may file a motion to reopen proceedings. De Martinez v. Ashcroft, 374. . .

CALLAHAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
I concur with my colleagues’ rejection of GranadosOseguera’s equal protection claim. I must dissent, however, from their expansion of our jurisdiction — in contravention of our precedents — to reach an ineffective assistance of counsel claim that has never been raised before the Board of Immigra. . .