The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in USA v. BENZ, No. 06-10167, a criminal appeal. The panel consisted of Myron H. Bright, Dorothy W. Nelson, and Marsha S. Berzon, Circuit Judges.

D.W. NELSON, Senior Circuit Judge:
Joachim Benz (”Benz”) appeals his guilty plea conviction and the sentence that was imposed for his driving on a suspended license, in violation of the Assimilative Crimes Act . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in USA v. ANDERSON, No. 05-30211, a criminal appeal. The panel consisted of Dorothy W. Nelson, David R. Thompson, and Richard A. Paez, Circuit Judges.

THOMPSON, Senior Circuit Judge:
Defendant-Appellant Keith E. Anderson appeals his convictions and sentence for conspiracy to defraud the United States, conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, aiding and assisting the filing of materially false income tax returns, mail fraud, wire fraud, conspiracy to commit money laundering, and international money laundering. Anderson received a sentence of twenty years in prison, three years of supervised release, and monetary penalties. Anderson contends that his convictions and sentence should be reversed because his appeal of the annulment of his Costa Rican citizenship was pending in Costa Rica when he was extradited to the United States to stand trial for the above-listed offenses. Therefore, he asserts the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. Anderson also argues for the first time in his reply brief filed in this Court that his convictions for money laundering and conspiracy to commit money laundering should be vacated under the doctrines of dual criminality and specialty because the Costa Rican court specifically held that the money laundering offenses did not satisfy the terms of the extradition treaty and refused to grant the United States’ extradition request for those charges. . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in HOSSEINI v. GONZALES, No. 03-73734, an administrative appeal. The panel consisted of William C. Canby, Jr., Ronald M. Gould, and Carlos T. Bea, Circuit Judges.

CANBY, Circuit Judge:
Masoud Hosseini is an Iranian citizen who came to the United States on a student visa. He did not attend school and he overstayed his visa. He was ordered deported as an overstay, but he subsequently succeeded in having his deportation proceeding reopened. He sought asylum, withholding of deportation, and adjustment of status under the Immigration and Nationality Act (”INA”). He also sought withholding and deferral of deportation under the Convention Against Torture. An immigration judge denied Hosseini all relief under the INA primarily because of his connection and activities with the Iranian dissident group Mujahedin-e Khalq (”MEK”),. . .

The request of the government for clarification of this court’s opinion, reported at 464 F.3d 1018, is GRANTED. The opinion of this court, filed September 28, 2006, is amended as follows: At 464 F.3d 1024, first full paragraph, immediately following the citation to Travel Document Requirements for Citizens of the Islamic Republic of Iran, indicate a new footnote 6. That footnote is to state:
The government points out that it is precluded by regulation from disclosing any information relating to Hosseini’s asylum application “without the written consent” of Hosseini. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a). Although that regulation restrains the government, it does not impede Iran’s actions. Original footnote 6 is then renumbered to become footnote 7. OPINION CANBY, Circuit Judge:
Masoud Hosseini is an Iranian citizen who came to the United States on a student visa. He did not attend school and he overstayed his visa. He was ordered deported as an overstay, but he subsequently succeeded in having his deportation proceeding reopened. He sought asylum, withholding of deportation, and adjustment of status under the Immigration and Nationality Act (”INA”). He also sought withholding and deferral of deportation under the Convention Against Torture. An immigration judge denied Hosseini all relief under the INA primarily because of his connection and activities with the Iranian dissident group Mujahedin-e Khalq (”MEK”),. . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in USA v. GOMEZ, No. 06-30288, a criminal appeal. The panel consisted of Betty B. Fletcher, Susan P. Graber, and M. Margaret McKeown, Circuit Judges.

GRABER, Circuit Judge:
Defendant Alan Gomez appeals his 60-month sentence for conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of a mixture containing a detectable amount of cocaine. The mandatory minimum sentence for that offense is 60 months’ imprisonment. Defendant did not qualify for the statutory “safety valve” that would have lifted the mandatory-minimum sentence–he had three criminal history points, but the statute disqualifies defendants who have more than one point. On appeal, Defendant argues that his disqualification from the safety valve is cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. On de novo review, United States v. Jensen, 425 F.3d 698, 706 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1664 (2006), we affirm. Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute 691.2 grams of a mixture containing detectable amounts of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B)(ii)(II), and 846. The statutory mandatory minimum sentence for that . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in USA v. LEE, No. 05-10478, a criminal appeal. The panel consisted of Stephen S. Trott, Kim McLane Wardlaw, and William A. Fletcher, Circuit Judges.

TROTT, Circuit Judge:
This appeal raises the issue of whether a person arrested in American Samoa for allegedly committing federal crimes in American Samoa may be tried and convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii (”District Court”). Kil Soo Lee (”Lee”) was convicted of extortion, money laundering, conspiring to violate the civil rights of others, and holding workers to a condition of involuntary servitude. Lee argues that his conviction and sentence are void because, first, the District Court lacked jurisdiction, and, second, the District of Hawaii was an improper venue. We disagree. We hold that the District Court had jurisdiction, and the District of Hawaii was a proper venue, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and 18 U.S.C. § 3238, respectively. I BACKGROUND Lee owned and operated a garment factory in American Samoa, an unincorporated territory of the United States . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an order in USA v. GONZALES, No. 04-30007, a criminal appeal. The panel consisted of Mary M. Schroeder, Chief Judge.

Upon the vote of a majority of nonrecused regular active judges of this court, it is ordered that this case be reheard by the en banc court pursuant to Circuit Rule 35-3. 19781 . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in USA v. SANDOVAL-MENDOZA, No. 04-10118, a criminal appeal. The panel consisted of Alfred T. Goodwin, Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, and Andrew J. Kleinfeld, Circuit Judges.

KLEINFELD, Circuit Judge:
This drug conspiracy case presents two principal issues. The first is whether the district court erred in ordering defense counsel not to talk to his client during an overnight recess. The second is whether the district court abused its discretion in excluding expert testimony about the defendant’s subnormal intelligence. We reverse. FACTS Twin brothers, Eduardo and Ricardo Sandoval-Mendoza, were convicted of conspiring to sell methamphetamine. Eduardo Sandoval-Mendoza sold the drugs. He argues that the government entrapped him as a matter of law. He also argues that the district court erroneously excluded medical evidence of an enormous brain tumor that made him espe. . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in USA v. BALDRICH, No. 05-50676, a criminal appeal. The panel consisted of A. Wallace Tashima, Carlos T. Bea, and Sandra S. Ikuta, Circuit Judges.

IKUTA, Circuit Judge:
Mario Baldrich pleaded guilty to five counts of bank robbery and one count of attempted bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). At sentencing, the district court denied Baldrich’s request for disclosure of the United States probation officer’s confidential sentencing recommendation as allowed by Rule 32(e)(3) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The district court also rejected Baldrich’s argument that he was entitled to a reduction in his offense level . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in HUSEMAN v. ICICLE SEAFOODS, No. 04-35655, a federal appeal. The panel consisted of Stephen Reinhardt, M. Margaret McKeown, and Richard R. Clifton, Circuit Judges.

McKEOWN, Circuit Judge:
Lanny Huseman appeals the district court’s decision on summary judgment that his Jones Act, 46 App. U.S.C. § 688, and unseaworthiness claims against Icicle Seafoods, Inc. (”Icicle”) were time-barred and that his maintenance and cure claim was barred by laches. As to the Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims, Huseman does not dispute that his filing was untimely and beyond the three year limitations period. Instead, he argues that he should be allowed to proceed under the theories of equitable tolling or equitable estoppel. Given the circumstances of this case, Huseman cannot establish the requirements for either equitable tolling or equitable estoppel. Huseman asks us to fashion, under the “wards . . .

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
The majority allows a maritime employer to exploit the ignorance of an injured seaman and avoid paying him the compensation to which he is entitled under federal law, although for untold years it has been the policy of admiralty law to protect all seamen against this very type of willful exploitation. Icicle Seafoods advised Huseman and other seamen, in their Terms of Employment and in the Employee Handbook, that if they were to be injured, their benefits would be paid by Alaska Workers’ Compensation, and Icicle would coordinate any other benefits to which they were entitled under federal maritime law. It did this knowing that under federal maritime law it is responsible for paying maintenance and cure to its injured employees and is liable to suit under the Jones Act and under the doctrine of unseaworthiness. Then, when Huseman was injured, Icicle filled out Alaska Workers’ Compensation paperwork for him and gave him the names and phone numbers of people to contact regarding the Alaska Workers’ Compensation claim. It did not mention, however, that it was required to provide more generous compensation under federal law and certainly did nothing to coordinate the federal benefits or protect Huseman’s legal rights. Icicle Seafood’s whole pattern of behavior was designed to lull Huseman into a false sense of security, making him believe that, as his employer, it was looking out for him because it was taking care of all of his claims, a belief that Icicle hoped would last until the statute of limitations ran on the federal claims. Then, when Huseman came to Icicle a few months after the statute of limitations ran, and asked it to pay him what he was due, as it had promised to do in his Terms of Employment, Icicle, having succeeded in its objective, refused, relying on the statute of limitations and the doctrine of laches as defenses. . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in USA v. LUONG, No. 01-10468, a criminal appeal. The panel consisted of William C. Canby, Jr., David R. Thompson, and Michael Daly Hawkins, Circuit Judges.

CANBY, Circuit Judge:
John That Luong, Huy Chi Luong, Hong Ai Le, and Mady Chan appeal their convictions and sentences for various crimes relating to their involvement in a criminal enterprise that engaged in robberies of computer companies and in heroin trafficking. In this opinion we address only one issue of statutory interpretation raised by the appellants. The statute in question authorizes a judge, upon proper showing, to authorize “interception of . . . electronic communications within the territorial jurisdiction of the court in which the judge is sitting.” 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3). The issue is whether this statute authorized the district court in the Northern District of California to authorize interception of communications to and from a mobile phone used by John Luong when that phone and its area code were located outside of the court’s territorial jurisdiction but the government’s listening post was located within it. We join several of our sister circuits in holding that the district court had jurisdiction because the intercepted communications were first heard by the government within the court’s district. . . .