The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in USA v. PEREZ, No. 06-30161, a criminal appeal. The panel consisted of Jerome Farris, Richard R. Clifton, and Carlos T. Bea, Circuit Judges.

BEA, Circuit Judge:
After United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), we adopted a limited remand procedure for certain cases in which the defendant had failed to object to the use of mandatory sentencing guidelines. Specifically, in cases where the record of trial is insufficient for us to determine whether the district court would have imposed a different sentence had it known the sentencing guidelines were advisory, we now require a socalled “limited Ameline remand.” See United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc). Under such a remand, the district court is given the opportunity to consider whether it would have imposed the same sentence had the guidelines been only advisory at the time of initial sentencing. If the district court decides it would have imposed the sentence regardless of the now-advisory nature of the guidelines, the sentence stands. If the district court decides the sentence would not have been the same, then a full re-sentencing will take place. Id. at 1079, 1084-85. However, where the trial record is sufficient for us to determine that but for the mandatory nature of sentencing guidelines pre-Booker there is a reasonable probability the sentence would have been different, the sentence is vacated and the . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in USA v. ZIEGLER, No. 05-30177, a criminal appeal. The panel consisted of Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Barry G. Silverman, and Ronald M. Gould, Circuit Judges.

O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge: We must determine whether an employee has an expectation of privacy in his workplace computer sufficient to suppress images of child pornography sought to be admitted into evidence in a criminal prosecution. If there is such an expectation, we must determine whether the search in this case was reasonable under the narrow exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. I A Frontline Processing (”Frontline”), a company that services Internet merchants by processing on-line electronic payments, is located in Bozeman, Montana. On January 30, 2001, Anthony Cochenour, the owner of Frontline’s Internet-service provider and the fiancé of a Frontline employee, contacted Special Agent James A. Kennedy, Jr. of the FBI with a tip that a Frontline employee had accessed child-pornographic websites from a workplace computer. . . .

The petition for panel rehearing is GRANTED. The opinion filed on August 8, 2006, is withdrawn. The superseding opinion will be filed concurrently with this order. Further petitions for rehearing or rehearing en banc may be filed. OPINION O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge: We must determine whether an employee has an expectation of privacy in his workplace computer sufficient to suppress images of child pornography sought to be admitted into evidence in a criminal prosecution. If there is such an expectation, we must determine whether the search in this case was reasonable under the narrow exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. I A Frontline Processing (”Frontline”), a company that services Internet merchants by processing on-line electronic payments, is located in Bozeman, Montana. On January 30, 2001, Anthony Cochenour, the owner of Frontline’s Internet-service provider and the fiancé of a Frontline employee, contacted Special Agent James A. Kennedy, Jr. of the FBI with a tip that a Frontline employee had accessed child-pornographic websites from a workplace computer. . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in USA v. TATOYAN, No. 05-50783, a criminal appeal. The panel consisted of Cornelia G. Kennedy, Cynthia Holcomb Hall, and Michael Daly Hawkins, Circuit Judges.

HAWKINS, Circuit Judge:
We examine the long-standing requirements surrounding the personal export of cash from the United States, the more recently enacted bulk cash smuggling prohibitions, and the ever-elusive requirement of willfulness. Here, as in many other areas, honesty remains the best policy. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY As they were about to board a flight to Paris at Los Angeles International Airport, Krikor and Zenda Tatoyan (”the Tatoyans”) were stopped by United States Customs Inspector . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in SAFE AIR FOR EVERYONE v. EPA, No. 05-75269, an administrative appeal. The panel consisted of Arthur L. Alarcón, Pamela Ann Rymer, and Marsha S. Berzon, Circuit Judges.

BERZON, Circuit Judge:
The Clean Air Act (”CAA” or “the Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q, authorizes the creation of air quality standards for a number of pollutants, including particulate matter produced as a byproduct of burning. To implement these standards, the Act establishes a system of State Implementation Plans (”SIPs”), whereby states submit, subject to the United States Environmental Protection Agency’s (”EPA”) review and approval, proposed methods for maintaining air quality. Once approved by EPA these plans “[h]av[e] `the force and effect of federal law.’ ” Trs. for Alaska v. Fink, 17 F.3d 1209, 1210 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 515 F.2d 206, 211 (8th Cir. 1975), aff’d, 427 U.S. 246 (1976)). In this case, we are presented with a preexisting SIP containing language that prohibits open burning generally and contains no exception allowing farmers to burn the residue left in their fields after harvesting their crops. Petitioner, Safe Air for Everyone (”SAFE”), challenges EPA’s decision to approve an amendment to that SIP authorizing such burning. SAFE argues that certain CAA provisions which prohibit amending SIPs so that they interfere with meeting air quality standards forbid EPA’s action, at least absent further analysis of field burning’s impact on Idaho’s air quality; EPA maintains that its approval of the amendment does not contravene any CAA provisions. We hold that as it presently stands, EPA’s approval is legally unsustainable. EPA grounded its approval of this amendment on the premise that the preexisting Idaho SIP did not ban field burning, so that the amendment only clarified what was already the case. This view of the preexisting SIP is one with which we cannot agree. Because our review of an administrative agency’s decision begins and ends with the . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in HALL v. NORTH AMERICAN VAN, No. 04-16182, a federal appeal. The panel consisted of Robert R. Beezer, Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, and Andrew J. Kleinfeld, Circuit Judges.

BEEZER, Circuit Judge:
We consider whether federal law preempts state law claims for breach of an interstate shipping contract and for common law fraud and conversion. The district court concluded that it had removal jurisdiction over Plaintiff-Appellant Eva Hall’s complaint because her claims were completely preempted by the 1906 Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, 49 U.S.C. § 14706. The district court denied Hall’s motion to remand and dismissed each of her claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we affirm. I The district court dismissed Hall’s complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). We accept as true . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in PN v. SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT, No. 04-36141, a federal appeal. The panel consisted of David R. Thompson, A. Wallace Tashima, and Consuelo M. Callahan, Circuit Judges.

CALLAHAN, Circuit Judge:
P.N., plaintiff-appellant, filed an action under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (”IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., to recover attorneys’ fees incurred in resolving a conflict with the Seattle School District (”SSD”) over her child’s education. The conflict was resolved by a settlement agreement signed only by the parties. The district court held that P.N. was not a prevailing party, and thus, not entitled to attorneys’ fees under the IDEA because the settlement agreement lacked any judicial imprimatur. We affirm. We hold, consistent with our own precedent and decisions by our sister circuits, that (a) the definition of “prevailing party” set forth by the Supreme Court in Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 600 (2001), applies to the IDEA’s attorneys’ fees provision, (b) the determination that a parent is a prevailing party requires that there be some judicial sanction of the settlement agreement, and (c) there is no judicial imprimatur of the settlement agreement in this case. I The IDEA seeks “to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education . . .

Our opinion filed August 15, 2006, is amended to include the following at the end of footnote 7. We further note that 20 U.S.C. § 1415 was amended subsequent to the underlying events in this case. We have no occasion to consider whether these amendments alter the statutory requirements for an award of attorneys’ fees under the IDEA. . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an amended order in USA v. JIANG, No. 05-10671, a criminal appeal. The panel consisted of BRIGHT, D.W. NELSON, and BERZON, Circuit Judges.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in USA v. ARNT, No. 05-50124, a criminal appeal. The panel consisted of Betty B. Fletcher, Ferdinand F. Fernandez, and Susan P. Graber, Circuit Judges.

B. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge:
A jury convicted LaTasha Lorraine Arnt of committing voluntary manslaughter while accompanying the Armed Forces of the United States in Turkey, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1112(a), 3261(a). The court sentenced her to eight years in prison and ordered her to pay restitution to the victim’s family. On appeal, Arnt raises several challenges to her conviction and sentence. She asserts that the indictment failed to allege an essential element and challenges several aspects of her conviction, including the sufficiency of the evidence and the . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in AF-CAP INC v. CHEVRON, No. 04-16387, a federal appeal. The panel consisted of Marsha S. Berzon, Johnnie B. Rawlinson, and Consuelo M. Callahan, Circuit Judges.

RAWLINSON, Circuit Judge:
In this consolidated action, Af-Cap Inc. (Af-Cap), the judgment creditor, appeals the district court’s judgment dissolving and vacating garnishments and liens filed against any property of the Republic of Congo (the Congo), the judgment debtor, held by third party ChevronTexaco Corporation (CT Corp) and domestic ChevronTexaco subsidiaries (collectively ChevronTexaco), and dismissing Af-Cap’s writ of execution action filed against ChevronTexaco, three ChevronTexaco foreign subsidiaries, and the Congo, a sovereign country. The Congo asserts a sovereign immunity defense against Af-Cap’s attempted execution of its judgment against the Congo’s property allegedly held by ChevronTexaco. The property sought to be garnished includes intangible obligations of ChevronTexaco owed to the Congo for various bonuses, taxes, and royalties related to the extraction of hydrocarbons, oil, and other of the Congo’s natural resources. Because these obligations were not “used for a commercial activity in the United States,” they are protected from execution or collection under the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (FSIA) codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a). We therefore affirm the dismissal of this garnishment action. I. BACKGROUND This case involves a garnishment action against the Congo’s property in execution of a judgment for a defaulted $6.5 million loan made to the Congo by Af-Cap’s predecessor, Equator Bank. On December 18, 1984, pursuant to a loan agreement (the 1984 Loan Agreement), Equator Bank loaned $6.5 million to the Congo for the construction of a highway. The Congo consented to “execution against any property whatsoever (irre. . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in USA v. HECTOR, No. 05-50270, a criminal appeal. The panel consisted of Cynthia Holcomb Hall, M. Margaret McKeown, and Kim McLane Wardlaw, Circuit Judges.

McKEOWN, Circuit Judge:
Unlike many Fourth Amendment cases, here no one disputes that there was a valid search warrant issued by a state court judge on a showing of probable cause. Instead, the challenge is focused on whether there is a constitutional right under the Fourth Amendment to be presented with a copy of the search warrant at the time of the search, whether a defendant’s probationary status affects this analysis, and whether . . .