The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in USA v. THRASHER, No. 05-35929, a habeas corpus appeal. The panel consisted of J. Clifford Wallace, Ronald M. Gould, and Marsha S. Berzon, Circuit Judges.
WALLACE, Senior Circuit Judge:
Thrasher appeals from the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm. I In April 1997, Tia Carlson was driving a Ford automobile in Gresham, Oregon. Thrasher was in the passenger seat. Officer Durbin of the Gresham Police Department stopped the Ford after observing several traffic violations. When Carlson admitted that she had recently used methamphetamine, Officer Durbin arrested her for driving under the influence of an intoxicant and placed her in his police car. Officer Durbin returned to the Ford, where he informed Thrasher that Carlson was under arrest and that he would impound the vehicle. Thrasher showed Officer Durbin an Oregon driver’s license, which falsely indicated that his name was Trevor Shaw. Officer Durbin told Thrasher that he was free to go, and Thrasher departed on foot. When Officer Durbin searched the Ford, he discovered a briefcase containing a loaded .380 caliber semi-automatic pistol. Carlson first denied knowing anything about the briefcase and its contents, but later at the police station her story changed. According to Officer Durbin, she stated “that she knew that the gun was in the briefcase and knew who the briefcase belonged to.” Thrasher was subsequently apprehended and indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The case went to trial. During opening argument, Storkel, Thrasher’s counsel, advised the jury that it would hear testimony from Thrasher’s . . .
BERZON, Circuit Judge, concurring:
I agree with the panel that the law of the case exceptions do not apply to the rule of the mandate. See United States v. Bad Marriage, 439 F.3d 534, 541-42 (9th Cir. 2006) (Berzon, J., dissenting). I also agree, under compulsion of our precedent, that the rule of mandate is in some sense jurisdictional. See United States v. Kellington, 217 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that, in interpreting the mandate, “the ultimate task is to distinguish matters that have been decided on appeal, and are therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the lower court, from matters that have not” (emphasis added)); United States v. Pimentel, 34 F.3d 799, 800 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curium) (describing the mandate as limiting the district court’s “authority”). Although this case does not raise the issue, there are in my view very limited circumstances, as suggested in Bad Marriage, 439 F.3d at 541-42 (Berzon, J., dissenting), in which the district court may not be required to follow the directions we have given in our mandate. This conclusion would not necessarily be inconsistent with the use of the term “jurisdiction.” See Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 454-55 (2004) (” `Jurisdiction’ . . . is a word of many, too many, meanings.”); see also Eberhart v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 403, 406 (per curiam); United States v. Sadler, No. 06-10234, ___ F.3d ___, 2007 WL 610976, at *2 (9th Cir. Mar. 1, 2007). . . .