The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an order in NATIONAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC. v. WINTER, No. 07-56157, an appeal in a civil action against the United States. The panel consisted of KLEINFELD, CALLAHAN, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

MILAN D. SMITH, JR., Circuit Judge, dissenting in part and concurring in part. I respectfully dissent to the granting of a stay of the district court’s preliminary injunction. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it issued a preliminary injunction against the Navy’s use of MFA sonar during certain planned exercises in the SOCAL range through January 2009. The Navy has not shown a probability of success on the merits of this case or raised serious questions about the merits. In weighing the possibility of irreparable injury, balancing hardships, and determining where the public interest lies, the district court carefully considered and weighed the national security and public interest issues presented by this case. Until very recently, the Navy employed some environmental mitigation measures it now rejects in the name of national security. Moreover, the Navy has the ability to continue training its personnel in the use of MFA sonar technology pending the outcome of the merits of this case by conducting MFA sonar exercises outside the SOCAL range. In fact, the district court received evidence that the Navy is testing MFA sonar technology “all over the world all the time.” It is the Navy’s sharp starboard tack from its recent training practices that has left it in irons fighting environmental 14 . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in AAGESON GRAIN v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, No. 05-36172, an appeal in a civil action against the United States. The panel consisted of William C. Canby, Jr., Cynthia Holcomb Hall, and Consuelo M. Callahan, Circuit Judges.

CALLAHAN, Circuit Judge:
The United States Department of Agriculture (”USDA”) appeals the district court’s order remanding this case to the National Appeals Division (”NAD”) of the USDA to determine eligibility for an attorney’s fees and costs award under the Equal Access to Justice Act (”EAJA”). The farmers prevailed in their appeals before the NAD challenging their local Farm Service Agency’s (”FSA”) denials of claims under the 2003 Noninsured Crop Disaster Assistance Program (”NAP”). They then applied for attorney’s fees under the EAJA, which the NAD denied on the ground that the EAJA is inapplicable to NAD proceedings. The farmers filed a petition for judicial review, and the district court ruled that the EAJA applies to NAD proceedings and remanded. . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in MOLSKI v. EVERGREEN DYNASTY, No. 05-56452, a federal appeal. The panel consisted of Jerome Farris and Ronald M. Gould, Circuit Judges, and Kevin Thomas Duffy, District Judge.

PER CURIAM:
This appeal presents two orders of the district court for our review. The first order declared Jarek Molski a vexatious litigant and ordered that Molski obtain leave of the court before filing any claims under Title III of the Americans With Disabilities Act (”ADA”) in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. The second order sanctioned the law firm representing Molski, Thomas E. Frankovich, a Professional Law Corporation (”the Frankovich Group”), by requiring it to obtain leave of the court before filing any claims under Title III of the ADA in the Central District of California. We dismiss two of the defendantsappellees from this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. As to the remaining parties, we hold that the district court acted within its sound discretion in entering the pre-filing orders against Molski and against the Frankovich Group, and we affirm the orders of the district court. I Molski, who is paralyzed from the chest down, needs a wheelchair to get around. He has filed about 400 lawsuits in the federal courts within the districts in California. Molski lives in Woodland Hills, California, but frequently travels. According to Molski’s amended complaint in this case, during his travels, he stopped at the Mandarin Touch Restaurant in Solvang, California on January 25, 2003. After finishing his meal, Molski decided to use the restroom. Molski was able to . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in RESIDENT COUNCILS v. LEAVITT, No. 05-36065, an appeal in a civil action against the United States. The panel consisted of Michael Daly Hawkins and Kim McLane Wardlaw, Circuit Judges, and Louis H. Pollak, Senior District Judge.

HAWKINS, Circuit Judge:
As we are often called to do, we address a federal agency’s interpretation of words chosen by Congress and the sometimes tricky shoals of Chevron deference. Resident Councils of Washington, an organization consisting primarily of nursing and boarding home residents and their families, and the Washington State Long-Term Care Ombudsman Program, representing Washington’s long-term care facility residents (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), appeal the adverse grant of summary judgment in their challenge to the Secretary of Health and Human Services’s (”Secretary” or “agency”) regulations authorizing states to allow the use of paid feeding assistants to feed nursing home residents who do not have complicated feeding problems. Plaintiffs contend that the regulations violate the Nursing Home Reform Law (”Reform Law”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3, 1396r, by permitting “nursing or nursing-related services” to be performed by individuals not authorized by the statute. They argue that the regulations are not entitled to deference . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in CIR v. DUNKIN, No. 05-76004, a tax appeal. The panel consisted of Dorothy W. Nelson, Stephen Reinhardt, and Pamela Ann Rymer, Circuit Judges.

D.W. NELSON, Senior Circuit Judge:
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (”Commissioner”) appeals from a decision of the United States Tax Court allowing John Michael Dunkin (”John” or “appellant”) to reduce his taxable income for the 2000 tax year by $25,511–the amount he paid his former spouse Julie Green (”Julie”) incident to a division of community property assets upon marital dissolution. In 1997, a California Superior Court (”divorce court”) awarded Julie one half of the marital community’s interest in pension benefits provided by John’s employer. However, because John chose to continue working and did not terminate his participation in the plan following divorce, the pension administrator did not begin making distributions . . .

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
The majority passes over the existence of a significant ambiguity regarding an issue of California state law that has not been addressed by the state’s highest court. The question is whether a portion of a divorced employee’s wages should be treated as community property when it is used solely for the payment of an ex-spouse’s court ordered pension benefits that are community property; in such cases, the former spouse would have received the amount in question as pension benefits (i.e. community property) if her ex-husband had retired at the time he became eligible to do so. Alternatively, the amount of wages that is paid over to the ex-wife as pension benefits could be considered to be exclusively the husband’s wages and he would have to pay full taxes on that income even though he neither uses nor benefits from it. The majority chooses the latter option. I respectfully dissent. I would certify the question of how to treat the money involved under California law to the California Supreme Court. The majority opinion imposes negative tax consequences on a police officer who chooses to work past retirement eligibility age and thus to defer collection of his pension. It requires him to pay full income taxes on the part of his salary that he pays over to his former wife as her community interest in his pension benefits — a result that defies reason, not to mention fairness. If the payment were considered to be what it actually is, a distribution of the ex-wife’s interest in the pension benefits, the husband would not have to pay any taxes on the amount in question. If the question were certified, I think . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in WILLIAMS v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC., No. 05-17072, a federal appeal. The panel consisted of Eugene E. Siler, Jr., M. Margaret McKeown, and Carlos T. Bea, Circuit Judges.

McKEOWN, Circuit Judge:
Anthony L. Williams appeals the district court’s dismissal of his complaint alleging violations of the Federal Airline Deregulation Act’s Whistleblower Protection Program (the “WPP”), 49 U.S.C. § 42121, and related state law claims. At issue in this case is whether an aggrieved employee may bring a suit in federal district court to allege violations of the WPP. We hold that the WPP does not create such a right of action and affirm the district court’s dismissal of Williams’s action on the basis that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in MERRICK v. PAUL REVERE LIFE INSURANCE, No. 05-16380, a diversity appeal. The panel consisted of Cynthia Holcomb Hall, Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, and Sandra S. Ikuta, Circuit Judges.

HALL, Senior Circuit Judge:
Defendants Paul Revere Life Insurance Company and Unum Provident Corporation (collectively “the insurers”) appeal the district court’s jury verdict awarding $1.65 million in compensatory and $10 million in punitive damages to plaintiff G. Clinton Merrick, Jr. for breach of contract and of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, stemming from the insurers’ denial of Merrick’s disability insurance claim. Among other issues, this appeal requires us to examine the constitutional limits upon the use of evidence of injury inflicted upon nonparties, as discussed in Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1063 (2007). The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for a new trial on punitive damages due to the district court’s failure to give an adequate limiting jury instruction under Williams. I. Background A. History of Merrick’s Claim G. Clinton Merrick, Jr. purchased an “own occupation” disability policy from defendant Paul Revere Life Insurance Company in 1989. Under that policy, if Merrick was “unable to perform the important duties of [his] Occupation” due to “Injury or Sickness,” he was entitled to a “total disability” benefit of $12,000 per month for the duration of his disability. At the time, Merrick was one of three partners at a venture capital firm, responsible for raising capital, evaluating invest. . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in USA v. STANTON, No. 06-10519, a criminal appeal. The panel consisted of Alfred T. Goodwin, Jay S. Bybee, and Milan D. Smith, Circuit Judges.

GOODWIN, Circuit Judge:
A magistrate judge found Randy S. Stanton (”Stanton”) guilty of driving while under the influence of alcohol to a degree that rendered him incapable of safe operation. On appeal from this conviction the district court reversed, holding . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in DHX, INC. v. SURFACE TRANSPORTATION BOARD, No. 05-74592, an administrative appeal. The panel consisted of Sidney R. Thomas, Raymond C. Fisher, and Ronald M. Gould, Circuit Judges.

GOULD, Circuit Judge:
DHX, Inc., a freight forwarder, petitions for review of a decision by the Surface Transportation Board (”STB”) denying its complaint challenging the reasonableness of certain rates and practices of Matson Navigation Co., Inc. (”Matson”), and Sea-Land Service, Inc., now Horizon Lines, LLC (”Horizon”), two water carriers operating in the noncontiguous domestic trade between Hawaii and ports in the continental United States. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2321 and 2342(5), and we deny the petition for review. I. A The STB is a successor to the Interstate Commerce Commission (”ICC”). In the ICC Termination Act of 1995 . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in USA v. DEGEORGE, No. 05-56642, a diversity appeal. The panel consisted of Daniel M. Friedman, Alex Kozinski, and Ronald M. Gould, Circuit Judges.

GOULD, Circuit Judge:
In September 2005, Rex K. DeGeorge (”DeGeorge”) recovered a civil judgment award for unpaid disability income. To help pay a previous restitution order that DeGeorge had not satisfied, the United States used California state law procedure to file, and then execute in federal court on, a judgment lien against this award. Although DeGeorge’s disability income would have been explicitly exempt from the judgment lien under California law, the government argued that federal, not state, property exemptions should apply in this case. Accepting the government’s argument and position on this, the federal district court ordered the government’s judgment lien enforced. DeGeorge appeals this order. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We conclude that because the government chose to use California execution law, and the federal law did not preempt this state law on execution, the federal property exemptions do not override California’s property exemptions. I DeGeorge was indicted in January 1999, and by superseding indictment in April 2000, on sixteen counts of mail fraud, wire fraud, perjury, and conspiracy. He pled guilty and was. . .