SDV/ACCI, INC. v. AT&T CORORATION
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in SDV/ACCI, INC. v. AT&T CORORATION, No. 06-15860, a diversity appeal. The panel consisted of William C. Canby, Jr., David R. Thompson, and Milan D. Smith, Jr., Circuit Judges.
CANBY, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiffs SDV/ACCI, Tonia Metz and Gerald Metz brought this action against AT&T and one of its employees, Margaret Roman, alleging that Ms. Roman defamed the plaintiffs in the course of her employment. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, ruling that the Metzes were not proper plaintiffs, and that the allegedly defamatory statements were conditionally privileged. It further ruled that SDV/ACCI, as the remaining plaintiff, could not defeat the privilege because there was no evidence that Ms. Roman made the allegedly defamatory statements with malice or without a good faith belief in their truth. The plaintiffs appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ยง 1291. We affirm in part, and reverse in part. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Plaintiff SDV/ACCI, Inc., is a company that provides clients with consulting and staffing services. Plaintiffs Mr. and Ms. Metz are the company’s CFO and CEO, respectively, and its sole shareholders. Effective February 1, 1999, defendant AT&T and SDV/ACCI entered into an agreement under which SDV/ACCI would provide temporary workers to AT&T and its subsidiaries. The agreement specified that all invoices would be payable by AT&T ten days from the date of receipt. The parties agree that over the life of the agreement, AT&T failed to pay many of these bills on time. In her affidavit, Ms. Metz claimed that she confronted AT&T procurement spe. . .
MILAN D. SMITH, JR., Circuit Judge, concurring in part, and dissenting in part:
I concur in Part I of the majority opinion, affirming summary judgment as to the Metzes’ individual claims because they have failed to present evidence that any recipient of the emails actually understood them to refer to plaintiffs. I respectfully dissent, however, as to Part II.B because I would . . .