The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in MENDEZ-MENDEZ v. MUKASEY, No. 06-70851, an administrative appeal. The panel consisted of Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, A. Wallace Tashima, and Milan D. Smith, Jr., Circuit Judges.

TASHIMA, Circuit Judge:
Pablo Mendez-Mendez (”Mendez”), a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (”Board” or “BIA”), dismissing his appeal from an Immigration Judge’s (”IJ”) order of removal. The Board concluded that the IJ did not abuse her discretion in denying Mendez’s motion for a continuance, and that the IJ correctly concluded that Mendez did not qualify for the exception to inadmissibility found in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II). Accordingly, the Board dismissed Mendez’s appeal. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), and we deny the petition. BACKGROUND Mendez became a lawful permanent resident of the United States on December 1, 1990. On September 8, 1995, Mendez pled guilty to one count of bribery of a public official, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1)(A). The sentencing guideline range was zero to six months, and Mendez was sentenced to a three-month term of imprisonment. In 2003, Mendez was returning to the United States from Mexico and applied for admission as a lawful permanent resident. In April 2004, Mendez was served with a Notice to Appear, charging him with inadmissibility for being an alien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), based on his bribery conviction.. . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in SILAYA v. MUKASEY, No. 06-73822, an administrative appeal. The panel consisted of Stephen S. Trott and Sidney R. Thomas, Circuit Judges, and Michael R. Hogan, District Judge.

TROTT, Circuit Judge:
Rosalina Silaya (”Rosalina”) seeks review of the BIA’s decision denying her application for asylum, withholding of removal (”withholding”), and protection under the Convention Against Torture (”CAT”). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). Because the record compels a finding that Rosalina was subjected to past persecution on account of imputed political opinion, we grant the petition with respect to the asylum claim and remand to the BIA. . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in CHEN v. MUKASEY, No. 06-71430, an administrative appeal. The panel consisted of William C. Canby, Jr., Susan P. Graber, and Ronald M. Gould, Circuit Judges.

CANBY, Circuit Judge:
Petitioner Qing Li Chen is a citizen of China who is subject to a final order of removal. She seeks to file an application for . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in HERNANDEZ v. MUKASEY, No. 04-72696, an administrative appeal. The panel consisted of Stephen S. Trott, Richard R. Clifton, and Consuelo M. Callahan, Circuit Judges.

CALLAHAN, Circuit Judge:
Gerardo Hernandez and Elizabeth Prado, natives and citizens of Mexico, petition for review of the Board of Immigra. . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in ALALI-AMIN v. MUKASEY, No. 06-75411, an administrative appeal. The panel consisted of William C. Canby, Jr., and Milan D. Smith, Jr., Circuit Judges, and Stephen G. Larson, District Judge.

LARSON, District Judge:
Sayed Mohamad Alali-Amin, a native and citizen of Iran, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (”BIA”) decision dismissing his appeal from the immigration judge’s (”IJ”) denial of his motion to reopen as untimely. For the reason set forth below, we deny the petition. The REAL ID Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), confers jurisdiction upon this court to review constitutional claims and questions of law related to an order of removal. Petitioner was admitted to the United States on August 14, 1983, on a six-month, non-immigrant visa. On December 6, 1983, his status was changed to student, and he was authorized to remain for the duration of that status. On September 9, 1988, petitioner filed an application for asylum, which was denied on March 7, 1990, and petitioner was subjected to deportation proceedings because he failed to comply with the conditions of his status. On June 20, 1990, an Immigration Judge (”IJ”) found petitioner deportable and issued a deporta. . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in ORTIZ-MAGANA v. MUKASEY, No. 06-72797, an administrative appeal. The panel consisted of Barry G. Silverman, M. Margaret McKeown, and Richard C. Tallman, Circuit Judges.

TALLMAN, Circuit Judge:
Assault with a deadly weapon under California Penal Code § 245(a)(1) is a crime of violence as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 16; therefore, an alien convicted of that offense generally is an “aggravated felon” for immigration purposes. We must decide as a matter of first impression whether an alien is also an “aggravated felon” when he is convicted under section 245(a)(1) as an aider and abettor instead of as a principal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) ruled that no principled distinction can be drawn for immigration purposes between an alien’s status as an accessory and his role as a principal in the commission of a section 245(a)(1) aggravated felony. We agree, and deny the petition for review. I In 1991, Gerardo Ortiz-Magana (Ortiz-Magana), an eightyear-old native and citizen of Mexico, entered the United States without inspection or admission. On November 27, 1998, at the age of fifteen, he adjusted his status to become a lawful permanent resident. On December 29, 2003, Ortiz-Magana was charged, in a criminal information by the State of California, with assault. . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in NICARNOR-ROMERO v. MUKASEY, No. 03-73564, an administrative appeal. The panel consisted of Harry Pregerson, William A. Fletcher, and Jay S. Bybee, Circuit Judges.

W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge:
In 1990, a jury convicted Arturo Nicanor-Romero of a violation of California Penal Code § 647.6(a). At the time of his conviction, § 647.6(a) provided, “Every person who annoys or molests any child under the age of 18 shall be punished by a fine . . . , by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by both the fine and imprisonment.” It has been changed in immaterial respects since Nicanor-Romero’s conviction. A violation of § 647.6(a) is a misdemeanor. . . .

PREGERSON, Circuit Judge, specially concurring:
Our decision in this case is constrained by a meager record. All the record tells us is that Nicanor-Romero was convicted of violating § 647.6(a), a broadly written statute that provides, “Every person who annoys or molests any child under the age of 18 shall be punished by a fine . . . by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by both fine and imprisonment.” Cal. Pen. Code § 647.6(a) (West 2005). We also know that Nicanor-Romero was sentenced to 163-days in prison and was ordered to register as a sex offender. But the record does not tell us what Nicanor-Romero actually did to violate § 647.6(a). In fact, we have no knowledge of the factual circumstances that led to Nicanor-Romero’s misdemeanor conviction under § 647.6(a). Like Judge Fletcher, I conclude that there is a “realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility,” that a misdemeanor conviction under § 647.6(a) can be based on behavior that, while criminal, does not rise to the level of a “crime involving moral turpitude” within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). Section 647.6(a) encompasses behavior that is not morally turpitudinous and, consequently, I cannot conclude, given the meager record before us, that NicanorRomero’s violation of § 647.6(a) is a crime involving moral turpitude. I therefore join Judge Fletcher in refusing to hold that every violation of § 647.6(a) constitutes a crime of moral turpitude regardless of its factual circumstances. I disagree, however, with Judge Fletcher’s reliance on Peo- ple v. Villareal, 2003 WL 21153430 (Cal. Ct. App. May 20, 2003). In that case, Villareal, who was driving a pick-up truck, “stopped to talk to a 13-year old girl who was walking alone on an isolated street.” Id. at * 2. “[M]otivated by [his] sexual interest” in the young girl, Villareal referred to “a local `make out’ spot and to seeing stars.” Id. The girl believed these comments “were sexual in nature” and noted that Villareal was “smirking” at her. Id. She felt “scared and violated.” . . .

BYBEE, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
California Penal Code § 647.6(a) punishes objectively offensive behavior toward children that is motivated by an unnatural or abnormal sexual interest. The majority holds that violation of § 647.6(a) is not, categorically, a crime involving moral turpitude. The majority accomplishes this by focusing exclusively–and separately–on the actus reus and mens rea of the offense. However, we have never subjected sexual offenses to the type of rigorous actus reus and mens rea analysis employed by the majority to determine whether they involve moral turpitude. Rather, with sex crimes we have relied on contemporary moral standards and the distinction between malum in se and malum prohibitum offenses. The majority abandons both approaches. I agree with the majority that “[w]e have not relied on a consistent or easily applied set of criteria” to judge what constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude, and I would applaud any effort to reconcile the cases and bring clarity to . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in VILLEGAS v. MUKASEY, No. 04-74162, an administrative appeal. The panel consisted of Cynthia Holcomb Hall, Thomas G. Nelson, and Barry G. Silverman, Circuit Judges.

HALL, Circuit Judge: I. INTRODUCTION Petitioner Gilbert Michel Villegas is a citizen of Mexico with severe bipolar disorder, who was lawfully admitted to the United States. In 1996, he committed second degree robbery in violation of California Penal Code § 211. The government initiated removal proceedings because of this offense. Villegas conceded removability and sought withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (”CAT”). His theory was that if removed to Mexico, he would be unable to afford medications to control his disorder and likely wind up confined indefinitely in a Mexican mental institution, where conditions are deplorable. The IJ denied relief. He held that the robbery conviction was a “particularly serious crime” that precluded withholding of removal. As to CAT relief, the IJ ruled that although Villegas testified credibly and presented uncontested evidence of inhuman conditions in Mexican mental institutions, those conditions did not amount to “torture” because nothing indicated that they were created with the specific intent to harm the mentally disabled. The BIA summarily affirmed. As we explain below, we lack jurisdiction to address the withholding claim. As to the CAT claim, we hold that the IJ correctly construed “torture” to require specific intent to inflict harm — intent which is not present on this record. II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Villegas was born in Mexico in 1968 and came to the United States when he was five years old. He was admitted . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in PENULIAR v. MUKASEY, No. 03-71578, an administrative appeal. The panel consisted of James R. Browning, Harry Pregerson, and Marsha S. Berzon, Circuit Judges.

PREGERSON, Circuit Judge:
Nopring Paulino Penuliar petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (”BIA”). Penuliar, a lawful permanent resident, pled guilty to two counts of unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle in violation of California Vehicle Code § 10851(a), and one count of evading an officer in violation of California Vehicle Code § 2800.2(a). Classifying both convictions as “aggravated felonies” under the Immigration and Nationality Act (”INA”), an Immigration Judge (”IJ”), affirmed by the BIA, found Penuliar ineligible for cancellation of removal and voluntary departure, and ordered that Penuliar be deported pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (A)(iii). . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an order in IM v. MUKASEY, No. 05-70027, an administrative appeal. The panel consisted of Betty B. Fletcher, Eugene E. Siler, Jr., Michael Daly Hawkins, Circuit Judges.

The Opinion filed August 13, 2007, appearing at 497 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2007), is withdrawn. Further consideration of this appeal pends the Supreme Court’s decision in Negusie v. Mukasey, No. 07-499, or further order of this court. It may not be cited as precedent by or to this court or any district court of the Ninth Circuit. *Michael B. Mukasey is substituted for his predecessor, Alberto R. Gonzales, as Attorney General of the United States, pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2). **The Honorable Eugene E. Siler, Jr., Senior United States Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation. 3837 . . .