The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY v. FLRA, No. 05-76031, an administrative appeal. The panel consisted of Alex Kozinski, Chief Judge, Robert E. Cowen, and Michael Daly Hawkins, Circuit Judges.

COWEN, Circuit Judge:
The Department of Treasury, Internal Revenue Service (”IRS”), petitions this court to review an August 10, 2005, order by the Federal Labor Relations Authority (”FLRA”). The FLRA, along with the intervenor, the National Treasury Employees Union (”NTEU”), has cross-petitioned this court to enforce the FLRA’s order. For the following reasons, we will deny the IRS’s petition for review and grant the FLRA’s cross-petition for enforcement. . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in MOMENI v. CHERTOFF, No. 07-55018, an administrative appeal. The panel consisted of Alex Kozinski, Chief Judge, Andrew J. Kleinfeld, and Richard C. Tallman, Circuit Judges.

KLEINFELD, Circuit Judge:
We consider whether a traveler to the United States under the Visa Waiver Program may contest deportation pending an application for adjustment of status. Momeni argues that under Freeman v. Gonzales the “no contest” provision of the 90-day tourist program does not apply to him, because he has since filed (and has pending) an application for adjustment of status, based on his marriage to a United States citizen. . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in OROZCO v. MUKASEY, No. 06-75021, an administrative appeal. The panel consisted of Kim McLane Wardlaw, Carlos T. Bea, and N. Randy Smith, Circuit Judges.

N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judge:
We hold that an alien, who obtains entry into the United States by fraudulent means, is statutorily ineligible for adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). Because petitioner Brian Orozco (”Orozco”) obtained entry into the United States by presenting identification that was not his own to an immigration agent, we hold that the Board of Immigration Appeals (”BIA”) and the immigration judge (”IJ”) properly denied Orozco’s application for adjustment of status under § 1255(a). Accordingly, we deny Orozco’s petition for review. I. Factual and Procedural Background Orozco entered the United States on January 11, 1996, at the San Ysidro, California checkpoint. Orozco did not possess . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an amended order in FERNANDEZ v. MUKASEY, No. 06-74228, an administrative appeal. The panel consisted of Betty B. Fletcher, Marsha S. Berzon, and Johnnie B. Rawlinson, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:
Petitioners Peter Fernandez and Martha Katigbak appeal from a final order of removal entered after the BIA denied their application for cancellation of removal due to their lack of a qualifying relative. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). Petitioners are devout Catholics who have attempted to conceive a child for many years. They contend that they have been unable to have a child due to their opposition to in vitro fertilization, a method disapproved by the Catholic church. Petitioners argue that the application of the statutory requirements for cancellation of removal to them violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (”RFRA”). We deny the petition. [1] Petitioners have failed to establish that the qualifying relative requirement for cancellation places a substantial burden on their religious exercise under RFRA. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a). First, petitioners have not established that their lack of a qualifying relative is due to their religious beliefs. Adopted children are treated as qualifying relatives for purposes of the cancellation of removal statute. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(E). Petitioners have not claimed that their Catholic beliefs prevent them from adopting a child. They state. . .

The opinion filed on January 7, 2008 and published at slip opinion 165-169 is amended as follows:
Replace the final sentence of the last full paragraph on page 168 with the following:
The difficulty of meeting this standard is reflected in the rarity of grants of cancellation of removal to aliens who are not legal permanent residents: in 2006, only 3,144 individuals were granted typical cancellation of removal for a nonpermanent resident, well below the annual cap of 4,000 imposed by statute. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(e)(1); United States Department of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review, FISCAL YEAR 2006 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, Table 15. . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in HUANG v. MUKASEY, No. 04-73309, an administrative appeal. The panel consisted of Alfred T. Goodwin, Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, and William A. Fletcher, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:
Meihua Huang and his wife, Mingyan Qiu, natives and citizens of China, petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (”BIA”) order. The order dismissed their appeal from an Immigration Judge’s (”IJ”) decision denying their application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. We grant the petition for review in part, dismiss in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. [1] In an oral decision, the IJ denied relief because “[b]ased on the numerous, significant inconsistencies in [Huang]’s representations of record, the Court reluctantly concludes that he has failed to discharge his burden of proving past persecution . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an amended order in RENDON v. MUKASEY, No. 05-77064, an administrative appeal. The panel consisted of Mary M. Schroeder, Cynthia Holcomb Hall, and Jay S. Bybee, Circuit Judges.

BYBEE, Circuit Judge:
In this case, we consider whether a state felony conviction for possession with intent to sell a controlled substance contains a trafficking element. We conclude that it does and therefore it qualifies as an aggravated felony under the immigration laws. I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Benedicto Rendon is a native and citizen of Mexico who has been a lawful permanent resident of the United States since 1995. In April 1997, he was convicted of possession with the intent to sell marijuana under Kansas law (the “Kansas conviction”). See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4163(a). Six years . . .

The opinion, filed on February 15, 2008, slip opinion 1417, is amended as follows:
At slip opinion 1422, first full paragraph, last sentence, replace “Rendon then timely appealed.”, with “Rendon then timely appealed to this court, and was appointed pro bono counsel for the appeal.” At slip opinion 1424, footnote 2, last sentence, replace “Rendon’s counsel could have challenged the IJ’s decision on this issue, but simply did not do so.”, with “Rendon’s previous attorney could have challenged the IJ’s decision on this issue, but simply did not do so.” The Motion by Petitioner for Clarification or Correction of Decision is GRANTED to the extent of these amendments. OPINION BYBEE, Circuit Judge:
In this case, we consider whether a state felony conviction for possession with intent to sell a controlled substance contains a trafficking element. We conclude that it does and therefore it qualifies as an aggravated felony under the immigration laws. I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Benedicto Rendon is a native and citizen of Mexico who has been a lawful permanent resident of the United States since 1995. In April 1997, he was convicted of possession with the intent to sell marijuana under Kansas law (the “Kansas conviction”). See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4163(a). Six years . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an en banc opinion in MARMOLEJO-CAMPOS v. MUKASEY, No. 04-76644, an administrative appeal.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in MUSTANISH v. MUKASEY, No. 04-74290, an administrative appeal. The panel consisted of Jerome Farris and Milan D. Smith, Jr., Circuit Judges, and H. Russel Holland, District Judge.

MILAN D. SMITH, JR., Circuit Judge:
In this appeal, we consider Petitioner Jess Mustanich’s (Mustanich) petition for review of a final order of removal by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). Mustanich was convicted of burglary and subsequently ordered removed under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) as an alien who committed an aggravated felony. He seeks to terminate his removal proceedings on the ground that he is a United States citizen, arguing that although he did not file an application for naturalization prior to the applicable statutory deadline, the United States is equitably estopped from denying his citizenship because the Government’s own affirmative misconduct precluded a timely filing. We reject this argument and deny the petition on the authority of INS v. Pangilinan, 486 U.S. 875 (1988), which established that citizenship cannot be conferred by estoppel where the statutory requirements for naturalization have not been satisfied. Mustanich also moves to transfer his case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing regarding his possible United States citizenship. We deny the motion because there is no genuine issue of material fact concerning nationality. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5)(A). I. BACKGROUND Mustanich was born in El Salvador on August 15, 1978 and adopted shortly thereafter by two United States citizens. In February 1979, he became a lawful permanent resident of the United States. Because Mustanich was born outside the country, he was required to satisfy the requirements of 8 U.S.C. § 1433 before becoming a naturalized citizen. One requireThe Child Citizenship Act of 2000 (CCA) established that a naturalization application need not be filed in accordance with § 1433 if a child born . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in LEMUS-GALVAN v MUKASEY, No. 04-72651, an administrative appeal. The panel consisted of Alex Kozinski, Chief Judge, A. Wallace Tashima and M. Margaret McKeown, Circuit Judges.

McKEOWN, Circuit Judge:
Gustavo Lemus-Galvan seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (”BIA”) summary affirmance of the Immigration Judge’s (”IJ”) denial of deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (”CAT”). Notwithstanding that Lemus-Galvan was ordered removed on the basis of an aggravated felony, we have jurisdiction over his deferral of removal claim under the CAT. See Morales v. Gonzales, 478 F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 2007). BACKGROUND Lemus-Galvan is a native and citizen of Mexico who has been a legal permanent resident of the United States since 1982. He was convicted of attempted second degree murder. On the basis of that conviction, he was denied relief under § 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act and ordered deported in 1996. After the BIA dismissed his appeal of that order, LemusGalvan moved to reopen proceedings to apply for deferral of removal under the CAT. He alleged that if he were returned to Mexico, it was more likely than not that he would be tortured by the Pimental family, a drug cartel that had been involved in a violent turf war with members of LemusGalvan’s extended family in the northern border regions of Mexico. In 1999, an IJ granted reopening but denied deferral of removal under the CAT, finding that it was more likely than not that Lemus-Galvan could safely relocate to another part of. . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in AL-MOUSA v. MUKASEY, No. 06-70638, an administrative appeal. The panel consisted of Betty B. Fletcher, William C. Canby, Jr., and Johnnie B. Rawlinson, Circuit Judges.

B. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge:
Khalid Al-Mousa, native of Sudan and citizen of Saudi Arabia, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals (”BIA”) decision dismissing the appeal from the immigration judge’s (”IJ”) denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (”CAT”). Al-Mousa asserted past persecution and a fear of future persecution in Saudi Arabia on account of his ethnicity or dark skin color. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s findings that Al-Mousa’s asylum application was time-barred, and that he failed to establish a credible claim for relief. AlMousa appeals, claiming he is excused from the one-year bar . . .

RAWLINSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s remand of this case to the Board of Immigration Appeals “to consider whether, as a matter of law, individuals under twenty-one years of age are minors under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(5)(ii).” . . .