The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in ESPINOSA v. UNITED STUDENT FUNDS, No. 06-16421, a bankruptcy appeal. The panel consisted of Alex Kozinski, Chief Judge, A. Wallace Tashima and N. Randy Smith, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:
Espinosa obtained $13,250.00 in student loans from United Student Aid Funds, Inc. (Funds). He later filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition and plan. The plan provided that he repay the $13,250.00 principal, and that accrued capitalized interest, penalties, and fees be discharged. The clerk of the bankruptcy court mailed a notice of commencement and a copy of the proposed plan to Funds, which gave Funds the usual notice of the date and time of the plan confirmation hearing and the deadline for filing objections to the plan. Funds then filed a proof of claim for $17,832.15, which presumably included unpaid accrued capitalized interest, penalties, and fees. But Funds filed no objections to the plan, and as there were no other creditors, the bankruptcy court confirmed the plan as proposed. Espinosa subsequently paid Funds $13,250.00 over the course of four years, at which point the plan was completed and the bankruptcy court issued a discharge order, filed May 30, 1997. Curiously, the discharge order provided that Espinosa was “discharged from all debts provided for by the plan . . . except any debt . . . for a student loan,” which contradicted the terms of the plan and pretty much rendered the whole exercise pointless from Espinosa’s point of view. Curiouser still, Espinosa did not seek reconsideration of the discharge order, nor did he appeal. Three years after the discharge order was filed, Funds began “offsetting” or “intercept[ing]” Espinosa’s income tax refunds to satisfy the unpaid portion of the student loan. (The parties don’t explain what they mean by “offsetting” and “intercept[ing],” but we assume they mean that Funds somehow . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in MANEY v. KAGENVEAMA, No. 06-17038, a bankruptcy appeal. The panel consisted of Harry Pregerson, Eugene E. Siler, Jr., and Carlos T. Bea, Circuit Judges.

SILER, Circuit Judge: Edward Maney, as Chapter 13 Trustee, appeals the bankruptcy court’s order confirming the plan of the debtor, Laura Kagenveama. He argues that the bankruptcy court erred by (1) calculating Kagenveama’s “projected disposable income” by multiplying her “disposable income” over the “applicable commitment period” and (2) finding the five-year “applicable commitment period” inapplicable because Kagenveama’s resulting “projected disposable income” was a negative number. We affirm. I. Background In 2005, Kagenveama filed a petition for Chapter 13 protection in the bankruptcy court. In her filing she included the required Schedules A through J, a Statement of Financial Affairs, a Master Mailing List, and a Form B22C Statement of Current Monthly Income and Calculation of Commitment Period and Disposable Income. Schedules I and J listed Kagenveama’s projected monthly income and expenses. Her Schedule I listed a monthly gross income of $6,168.21, with a monthly net income of $4,096.26. Her Schedule J listed monthly expenses of $2,572.37. Subtracting total monthly expenses from total monthly net income left Kagenveama with $1,523.89 in monthly income available to pay creditors. Kagenveama filed an amended Form B22C listing an average monthly gross income of $6,168.21 for the six months prior to her bankruptcy petition, yielding an annual income of . . .

The opinion in Maney v. Kagenveama, filed June 5, 2008, is amended as follows: insert <In re Pak, 378 B.R. 257, 267 . . .

BEA, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part: This case deals with how long a Chapter 13, “wage-earner” debtor in bankruptcy proceedings will have to worry about whether his unpaid creditors can bring up any good changes in his fortunes, to get paid his debts to them. The majority lays down a rule: So long as the debtor can calculate no “disposable income” at the time his creditor plan is confirmed, he can rest easy. The debtor can propose as short a time period as he wants: a day, a week or a month. I dissent because Congress pretty clearly stated his creditors should have up to five years to keep an eye on the debtor to perhaps share in any of his new good times. Respectfully to the majority, I think the rule they adopt creates an incentive for the picaresque, by encouraging a debtor to fiddle with his expenses and income just before he presents his creditor plan for confirmation. So long as he can push up his expenses and delay receipt of income so as to show no “disposable income” at the time of plan confirmation, he can propose such a short period of time that he can save any postponed income from the creditors’ clutches. The majority’s result is not required by a close reading of the Bankruptcy Code; indeed, quite the opposite is the correct reading. For this reason, I partially dissent from the majority opinion. I concur in the majority opinion’s holding as to the calculation of “projected disposable income.” I agree projected disposable income in 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B) is calculated according to § 1325(b)(2)’s statutory definition of “disposable income”, using Form B22C–regardless the debtor’s actual disposable income on the date of plan confirmation–and then . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an order in IMPERIAL MERCHANT v. HUNT, No. 07-15976, a bankruptcy appeal. The panel consisted of Stephen S. Trott and Sidney R. Thomas, Circuit Judges, and Michael R. Hogan, District Judge.

We respectfully certify the following question to the Supreme Court of California as set forth in the attached request: 1. May a debt collector recovering on a dishonored check impose both a service charge under section 1719 of the California Civil Code and prejudgment interest under section 3287 of the California Civil Code? We stay all further proceedings in this case in this Court and the district court pending receipt of the answer to the cer*The Honorable Michael R. Hogan, United States District Judge for the District of Oregon, sitting by designation. 5243 . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an order in TRAVELERS CASUALTY v. PG&E, No. 04-15605, a bankruptcy appeal. The panel consisted of Stephen Reinhardt and Sidney R. Thomas, Circuit Judges, and Jane A. Restani, Judge.

This case is hereby resubmitted. Pursuant to the judgment of the United States Supreme Court issued on March 20, 2008 in Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1199, 167 L.Ed.2d 178 (2007), we vacate our disposition at 167 Fed.Appx. 593 (9th Cir. 2006), vacate the district court’s decision as well as the bankruptcy court’s decision, and remand to the district court with instructions to remand to the bankruptcy court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion of the Supreme Court. *The Honorable Jane A. Restani, Chief Judge, United States Court of International Trade, sitting by designation. 5085 . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in STRAIGHTLINE INVEST v. AALFS, No. 05-15979, a bankruptcy appeal. The panel consisted of David R. Thompson, Andrew J. Kleinfeld, and Sidney R. Thomas, Circuit Judges.

THOMPSON, Senior Circuit Judge:
Appellant Charles D. Aalfs (”Aalfs”) appeals a decision by the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (”BAP”) affirming the bankruptcy court’s judgment under 11 U.S.C. § 549(a) avoiding the transfer to Aalfs of Straightline Investments, Inc.’s (”Debtor” or “Straightline”) accounts receivable which had a face value of approximately $200,600. In avoiding the transfer, the bankruptcy court ordered Aalfs to pay the Straightline trustee $163,007, the amount collected by Aalfs . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an order in DEROCHE v. ARIZONA INDUSTRIAL, No. 04-15258, a bankruptcy appeal. The panel consisted of Stephen Reinhardt and Sidney R. Thomas, Circuit Judges, and Jane A. Restani, Judge.

This case is hereby resubmitted. Pursuant to the judgment of the United States Supreme Court issued on March 20, 2008 in Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1199, 167 L.Ed.2d 178 (2007), we vacate our opinion at 434 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2006), vacate the district court’s decision as well as the bankruptcy court’s decision, *The Honorable Jane A. Restani, Chief Judge, United States Court of International Trade, sitting by designation. 4935 . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in JOHNSON v. NEILSON, No. 06-56334, a bankruptcy appeal. The panel consisted of Robert R. Beezer, Thomas G. Nelson, and Barry G. Silverman, Circuit Judges.

T.G. NELSON, Circuit Judge:
The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment in favor of the Trustee of the bankruptcy estate of Reed E. Slatkin, avoiding under 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) and California Civil Code § 3439.04(a) certain transfers made by Slatkin during his operation of a Ponzi scheme. The district court affirmed the grant of summary judgment. We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY In May 2001, Slatkin filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. Shortly thereafter, he was charged in a federal criminal case with mail fraud, wire fraud, money laundering, and . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in MACKENZIE v. BARCLAY, No. 06-55033, a bankruptcy appeal. The panel consisted of Stephen S. Trott, Richard R. Clifton, and Consuelo M. Callahan, Circuit Judges.

TROTT, Circuit Judge:
The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment in favor of the Trustee for Advance Finance Incorporated (”AFI”), avoiding transfers from AFI to Keith Mackenzie under CAL. CIV. CODE § 3439.04(a), and holding that the good faith exception to fraudulent transfers under CAL. CIV. CODE §3439.08(a) was barred as a matter of law because no “reasonably equivalent value” was exchanged for the transfers. The district court reversed and remanded, holding that the . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in WEINSTEIN EISEN WEIS v. GILL, No. 06-55624, a bankruptcy appeal. The panel consisted of Harry Pregerson, John T. Noonan, and Stephen S. Trott, Circuit Judges.

NOONAN, Circuit Judge:
Bankruptcy is an intensely practical affair. Bankruptcy seeks fair treatment for everyone. These two principles animate and guide the law within the statutory framework set by the Bankruptcy Code. In this case they appear to clash. On closer examination of the facts, the clash is chimerical. Weinstein, Eisen and Weiss (the Firm) appeals the judgment of the district court affirming the order of the bankruptcy judge in favor of David A. Gill, Chapter 11 Trustee (the Trustee). In this case of first impression in the Ninth Circuit, we affirm the judgment of the district court. . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in DITTO v. MCCURDY, No. 02-16252, a bankruptcy appeal. The panel consisted of Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, A. Wallace Tashima, and Milan D. Smith, Jr., Circuit Judges.

MILAN D. SMITH, JR., Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff-Appellant Janie Ditto appeals the decision of the district court affirming the bankruptcy court’s grant of Defendant-Appellee John McCurdy’s motion for summary judgment and denying Ditto’s motion for leave to amend the pleadings. Ditto seeks a judgment of non-dischargeability of McCurdy’s debt under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), which grants an exception to discharge for any debt “for willful and malicious injury by the debtor.” She argues that the malpractice judgment she previously secured against McCurdy, based in part on a theory of informed consent, constitutes a debt for “willful and malicious injury.” She also argues, in the alternative, that she should be permitted to amend her complaint to object to granting McCurdy a discharge in bankruptcy, even though McCurdy was granted a discharge more than a year before her motion to amend. We reject both arguments and affirm the district court’s decision. I Janie Ditto is a Korean immigrant who came to the United States in 1976. She suffers from several chronic illnesses, including diabetes and hyperthyroidism. The drug treatment for her hyperthyroidism caused her breasts to flatten, and in 1986 she went to John McCurdy for breast augmentation surgery. The surgery was unsuccessful, and resulted in complications requiring six additional surgical procedures over. . .