The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in SEC v. SHAW, No. 06-15204, an appeal in a civil action brought by the United States. The panel consisted of Sidney R. Thomas, Richard C. Tallman, and Sandra S. Ikuta, Circuit Judges.

TALLMAN, Circuit Judge:
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) filed a civil enforcement action against Lawrence Shaw. The SEC asserts it served Shaw through a British pro. . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an order in HEPTING v. AT&T CORPORTATION, No. 06-17131, an appeal in a civil action brought by the United States. The panel consisted of Harry Pregerson, Michael Daly Hawkins, and M. Margaret McKeown, Circuit Judges.

On April 26, 2007, Al-Haramain v. Bush, No. 06-36083, was consolidated with Hepting v. AT&T Corp., Nos. 0617132, 06-17137. The Clerk shall sever Al-Haramain v. Bush, No. 06-36083, from Hepting v. AT&T Corp., Nos. 06-17132, 06-17137, and the cases shall no longer be consolidated for any purpose. . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in SEC v. ROSS, No. 05-35541, an appeal in a civil action brought by the United States. The panel consisted of Dorothy W. Nelson, Andrew J. Kleinfeld, and Jay S. Bybee, Circuit Judges.

BYBEE, Circuit Judge:
Ernest Bustos and sixteen other Intervenor-Defendants (collectively, “Bustos”) appeal the district court’s order requiring them to disgorge commissions they received . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in USA EX. REL STONER v. SANTA CLARA, No. 04-15984, an appeal in a civil action brought by the United States. The panel consisted of Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain and Sandra S. Ikuta, Circuit Judges, and Leonard B. Sand, Senior District Judge.

IKUTA, Circuit Judge:
Under the False Claims Act (”FCA”), “[a]ny person” who, among other things, "knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or employee of the United States Government . . . a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval” is liable to the Government for a civil penalty, treble damages, and costs. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1). The FCA authorizes a private person, known as a relator, to bring a qui tam civil action “for a violation of section 3729 for the person and for the United States Government. . . . in the name of the Government.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1). This case requires us to decide whether a pro se relator may bring a qui tam action in federal court on behalf of the government against various actors in the California school system. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Appellant John David Stoner brought this qui tam action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California against the Santa Clara County Office of Education (”SCCOE”), his former employer, the East Side Union High School District (”ESUHSD”), and three SCCOE employees, Colleen Wilcox, Joe Fimiani, and David Wong. In the pro. . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an amended order in DEPARTMENT OF TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL v. BURLINGTON NORTHERN, No. 03-17125, an appeal in a civil action brought by the United States. The panel consisted of Betty B. Fletcher, John R. Gibson, and Marsha S. Berzon, Circuit Judges.

BERZON, Circuit Judge:
A now-defunct company, Brown & Bryant, Inc. (B&B), owned and operated a facility at which toxic chemicals were stored and distributed. Part of the land on which the chemical operation was located was owned by two railroad companies (the Railroads), and some of the chemicals used by B&B were supplied and delivered to the facility by Shell Oil Company (Shell). Because toxic chemicals remaining at the facility threatened groundwater and may continue to do so in the future, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the State of California’s Department of Toxic Substances Control (DTSC) spent a considerable amount of money to clean up the site and may need to spend more in the future. The two agencies sought to recover these response costs under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 9675,1 (CERCLA), but the district court held the Railroads and Shell liable for only a minor portion of the total cleanup costs. B&B was defunct by that time, and so could not contribute to the cleanup costs. The agencies were thus left holding the bag for a great deal of money. Seeking to hold the Railroads and Shell jointly and severally liable for the entire judgment, the agencies appeal. Shell cross-appeals, claiming that it was not an “arranger” under CERCLA, § 9607(a)(3), and therefore is not a party on whom any cleanup liability can be imposed. We reverse the portion of the judgment that declined to impose full joint and several. . .

The opinion filed March 16, 2007, slip op. 3209, and published at 479 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2007) is hereby amended as follows:
1. Replace <the State of California> with <the defendant oil companies> in the second sentence of footnote 30 on page 3250 of the slip opinion, 479 F.3d at 1139. 2. In the last paragraph of the opinion, on page 3256 of the slip opinion, 479 F.3d. at 1142, replace <The Railroads . . . the harm at the Arvin site.> with <The Railroads . . . the harm at the Arvin site, except with regard to the socalled “Dinoseb hot spot.”32> 3. Add the following text as footnote 32: <The district court found that the “Dinoseb hot spot” was a discrete area contaminated by Dinoseb (a Dow product) as the result of a major spill in 1983, that Shell did not manufacture or ship that product, and that Shell thus bore no responsibility for any part of the $1.3 million cost of cleaning up this discrete spill. The governments did not challenge this finding on appeal. That finding therefore stands, and the district court should not include the $1.3 million dollar cleanup costs for the “Dinoseb hot spot” in the calculation of Shell’s liability.> . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in SEC v. PHAN, No. 05-55269, an appeal in a civil action brought by the United States. The panel consisted of Harry Pregerson, William A. Fletcher, and Marsha S. Berzon, Circuit Judges.

BERZON, Circuit Judge:
The SEC alleged that Alan Phan used stock registered only for employee compensation purposes to raise capital from the public for the cash-strapped publicly traded company he led in 1999, thereby violating federal securities law. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the SEC, holding that Phan both engaged in an unregistered securities sale and committed securities fraud. In this appeal, Phan contends that the admissible evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to him, supports his position rather than the SEC’s. We affirm the district court’s summary judgment rulings concerning the registration issue. Whether or not the stock was initially issued to compensate bona fide consulting services, Phan was involved in its subsequent resale to raise capital for the company and thereby violated the registration provision of federal securities law. We agree with Phan, however, that the summary judgment record does not demonstrate that he made misstatements material as a matter of law. We therefore reverse the grant of summary judgment in favor of the SEC with respect to the antifraud claims and vacate much of the relief the district court awarded against Phan. . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in USA v. DANG, No. 04-17529, an appeal in a civil action brought by the United States. The panel consisted of Michael Daly Hawkins, A. Wallace Tashima, and Sidney R. Thomas, Circuit Judges.

THOMAS, Circuit Judge:
This appeal presents the question, among others, as to the constitutionality and validity of the Department of Homeland Security’s regulation pertaining to assessment of good moral character in naturalization proceedings. We conclude that the regulation passes constitutional muster and is not ultra vires as to its governing statute. We affirm the judgment of the district court. I After thirteen years of lawful permanent residence, Marilyn Thi Dang filed an Application for Naturalization with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (”INS”) on June 28, 1995. On February 2, 1996, Dang intentionally set fire to her van, severely burning herself and her four-month-old son. Meanwhile, the INS had been processing Dang’s application for naturalization. On March 12, 1996, after Dang had set fire to the van, Dang was interviewed under oath by an INS officer regarding her citizenship application. During the interview, Dang was asked, “Have you ever knowingly committed any crime for which you have not been arrested?” and Dang answered in the negative. The INS approved her application the same day. The next day, March 13, 1996, Dang was arrested and charged with arson, willful injury to a child, making a false report of a criminal offense, and two counts of insurance fraud. . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in DTSC, CALIFORNIA v. BURLINGTON NORTHERN, No. 03-17125, an appeal in a civil action brought by the United States. The panel consisted of Betty B. Fletcher, John R. Gibson, and Marsha S. Berzon, Circuit Judges.

BERZON, Circuit Judge:
A now-defunct company, Brown & Bryant, Inc. (B&B), owned and operated a facility at which toxic chemicals were stored and distributed. Part of the land on which the chemical operation was located was owned by two railroad companies (the Railroads), and some of the chemicals used by B&B were supplied and delivered to the facility by Shell Oil Company (Shell). Because toxic chemicals remaining at the facility threatened groundwater and may continue to do so in the future, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the State of California’s Department of Toxic Substances Control (DTSC) spent a considerable amount of money to clean up the site and may need to spend more in the future. The two agencies sought to recover these response costs under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 9675,1 (CERCLA), but the district court held the Railroads and Shell liable for only a minor portion of the total cleanup costs. B&B was defunct by that time, and so could not contribute to the cleanup costs. The agencies were thus left holding the bag for a great deal of money. . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in THE LANDS COUNCIL v. MARTIN, No. 06-35781, an appeal in a civil action brought by the United States. The panel consisted of Susan P. Graber, Richard A. Paez, and Carlos T. Bea, Circuit Judges.

GRABER, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiffs The Lands Council, Oregon Natural Resources Council, Hells Canyon Preservation Council, and Sierra Club, which are environmental organizations, appeal the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction to halt the implementation of several United States Forest Service post-fire logging sales in the Umatilla National Forest. American Forest Resource Council, Boise Building Solutions Manufacturing, L.L.C., and Dodge Logging, Inc., which are a forestry advocacy organization and logging companies, join Defendants (the Forest Service and the Forest Supervisor of the Umatilla National Forest) as intervenors. We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a preliminary injunction on Plaintiffs’ claims under the National Environmental Policy Act (”NEPA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370, but . . .

Defendants-Appellees’ letter dated February 15, 2007, requesting that the court strike or correct portions of the opinion is construed as a petition for panel rehearing and is ordered filed. The mandate issued February 12, 2007, is . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in USA v. NOVAK, No. 04-55838, an appeal in a civil action brought by the United States. The panel consisted of Mary M. Schroeder, Chief Circuit Judge, Harry Pregerson, Stephen Reinhardt, Andrew J. Kleinfeld, Michael Daly Hawkins, Sidney R. Thomas, Barry G. Silverman, M. Margaret McKeown, Kim McLane Wardlaw, William A. Fletcher, Richard A. Paez, Marsha S. Berzon, Johnnie B. Rawlinson, Richard R. Clifton, and Jay S. Bybee, Circuit Judges.

BERZON, Circuit Judge:
We are asked to determine whether — and if so, under what circumstances — a criminal defendant’s retirement benefits are available as a source of funds to compensate crime victims. Answering these questions requires reconciling two federal statutory schemes — one, the Mandatory Victims Res. . .

W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge, with whom Judges PREGERSON, REINHARDT, THOMAS, and RAWLINSON join, dissenting:
The question in this case is whether the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (MVRA), codified in relevant part at 18 U.S.C. § 3613, abrogates ERISA’s strict prohibition on alienation of pension benefits. The majority holds that it does. For two reasons, the majority is mistaken. First, the majority fails to recognize that our task in this case is limited. We are not called upon to clear up ambiguities of the MVRA. Rather, we are asked to decide whether that Act evinces an unmistakable intention to override ERISA’s anti-alienation provision. As the Supreme Court explained in Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers National Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365 (1990), ERISA’s anti-alienation provision “reflects a considered congressional policy choice,” and only a clear and specific legislative directive is sufficient to defeat it. Id. at 376. Moreover, it is settled law, wholly apart from Guidry, that Congress cannot repeal a prior law by implication unless it expresses a “clear and manifest” intention to do so. Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 154 (1976); see also Moyle v. Dir., OWCP, 147 F.3d 1116, 1119-21 (9th Cir. 1998) (using the doctrine of implied repeals to determine when a statute that purports to apply “notwithstanding” any other law actually displaces a pre-existing statute). Second, once our role is properly understood, it is apparent that the MVRA is not sufficiently clear. The relevant text of the MVRA is a relatively short “notwithstanding any other federal law” clause. The clause does not mention ERISA. Nor does the clause amend the Internal Revenue Code. The legislative history clearly indicates that Congress did not intend to abrogate ERISA’s anti-alienation provision when it adopted the MVRA. In 1996, prior to the passage of the MVRA, Senator McCain proposed a bill that would have . . .