The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in USA v. TUFF, No. 05-35195, an appeal in a civil action brought by the United States. The panel consisted of Alfred T. Goodwin and Alex Kozinski, Circuit Judges, and Milton I. Shadur, Senior District Judge.

GOODWIN, Circuit Judge:
James H. Tuff (”Tuff”) appeals the summary judgment granted the United States in its action to recover $208,513.20 refunded to Tuff by the Internal Revenue Service (”IRS”) in connection with stock options Tuff exercised in 1999 through a margin loan from Morgan Stanley. We affirm the judgment. I. BACKGROUND The appeal turns on whether Tuff received income in the form of shares of stock when he exercised his options, or when Morgan Stanley liquidated the shares after their value had declined. The material facts are not in dispute. Tuff was employed by RealNetworks, Inc., at a management level, and was classified as a corporate insider who could sell RealNetworks shares only during open trading windows approved by the company. As part of his compensation package Tuff received stock options, which he exercised twice in 1999 to purchase RealNetworks shares that had a total market value at the time of purchase of $460,093.75. The exercise, or “strike,” price of these shares was $6,137.00, making the difference, or spread, between their market value and exercise price $453,956.75. . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in AMERICAN FEDERATION v. PRINCIPI, No. 04-16607, an appeal in a civil action brought by the United States. The panel consisted of Mary M. Schroeder, Chief Judge, Susan P. Graber, Circuit Judge, and Kevin Thomas Duffy, Senior District Judge.

DUFFY, Senior District Judge:
Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Appellees American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO (”AFGE”), and Dr. Edwin Savlov (collectively “Appellants”) brought this action to challenge Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants’ (”Appellees” or “VA”) exemption from arbitration of a grievance that had been filed under the negotiated grievance procedure of a collective bargaining agreement. Ruling on cross . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in ZARETSKY v. JOHNSON CONTROLS, No. 04-55536, an appeal in a civil action brought by the United States. The panel consisted of William C. Canby, Jr., John T. Noonan, and Marsha S. Berzon, Circuit Judges.

BERZON, Circuit Judge: This case requires us to interpret, once again, the statutory provisions relating to the “public disclosure” bar and the “original source” exception to that bar in the Federal False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733, and the California False Claims Act (CFCA), CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 1265012656. We hold that the federal and state statutes do not require that an individual report relevant information to the government prior to the “public disclosure” at issue to qualify as an “original source.” I. Johnson Controls, Inc. (Johnson Controls, or the Company) manufactures control systems that monitor and coordinate the air environment in large buildings and building complexes. The Company sells its control systems both directly to endusers and through a network of independent distributors called “Authorized Building Controls Specialists” (ABCSs). Yardley-Zaretsky, Inc. and the George Yardley Co. (collectively, the Yardley Companies) operate as an ABCS. According to Roman Zaretsky, President of Yardley-Zaretsky, Inc., Johnson Controls threatened the Yardley Companies with termination if they bid against Johnson Controls itself on certain government jobs, including jobs at the Long Beach Veterans Administration Hospital and the University of California, Riverside. . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an en banc opinion in USA v. NOVAK, No. 04-55838, an appeal in a civil action brought by the United States. The panel consisted of SCHROEDER, Chief Judge.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in WIDMARK v. BARNHART, No. 04-35952, an appeal in a civil action brought by the United States. The panel consisted of James R. Browning, Dorothy W. Nelson, and Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Circuit Judges.

BROWNING, Circuit Judge:
Sterling Widmark appeals a decision of the district court affirming the Social Security Commissioner’s (”Commissioner”) denial of benefits. An Administrative Law Judge (”ALJ”) found Widmark, though severely impaired, had the residual functional capacity (”RFC”) for the full range of light work. Widmark argues that, in reaching his decision, the ALJ rejected the medical opinion of an examining physician without offering adequate reasons. Widmark also claims the ALJ erred in using the Medical-Vocational Guidelines in making his disability determination. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we hold that the ALJ improperly rejected the examining physician’s opinion regarding Widmark’s thumb. We also hold that this error made the ALJ’s use of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines in his final disability determination improper. Therefore, we reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. Widmark applied for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income on December 9, 1998, claiming disability with an onset date of May 1, 1997, due to back and neck pain. Both applications were denied. . . .

O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I respectfully dissent from the court’s conclusion that the ALJ failed to give specific legitimate reasons based on substantial evidence to support his conclusion that the thumb abnormality Dr. Greenleaf observed did not significantly limit the range of work permitted by Widmark’s exertional limitations. Indeed, I am persuaded that substantial evidence supports denial of Widmark’s application for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001). “Under this standard, the Commissioner’s findings are upheld if supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the record.” Batson v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004). “[I]f evidence exists to support more than one rational interpretation, we must defer to the Commissioner’s decision.” Id. “[T]he court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner.” Edlund, 253 F.3d at 1156. In situations of conflicting medical evidence, such as this one, the ALJ, not a reviewing court, is charged with determining credibility and resolving the conflict. Benton ex rel. Benton v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 1030, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003). We must defer to the ALJ’s decision to reject the opinion of a treating physician in favor of the conflicting opinion of an . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in NUCLEAR INFORMATION AND RESOURCE SERVICES v. US DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH AND SPECIAL PROGRAMS ADMINISTRATION, No. 05-16327, an appeal in a civil action brought by the United States. The panel consisted of Pamela Ann Rymer and Kim McLane Wardlaw, Circuit Judges, and James V. Selna, District Judge.

RYMER, Circuit Judge:
The Nuclear Information and Resource Service, Committee to Bridge the Gap, Public Citizen, Inc., Redwood Alliance, . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in MARCEAU v. BLACKFEET, No. 04-35210, an appeal in a civil action brought by the United States. The panel consisted of Harry Pregerson, Susan P. Graber, and Ronald M. Gould, Circuit Judges.

PREGERSON, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiffs represent members of the Blackfeet Indian tribe who purchased or leased homes built under the auspices of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (”HUD”) Mutual Help and Homeownership Program (”MHHO Program”). Plaintiffs’ homes were built with wood foundations, using wood pressure-treated with arsenic and other toxic chemicals. Plaintiffs allege that this use of wood foundations caused their homes to deteriorate, and that the present condition of the homes has caused and continues to cause severe health problems for the homes’ residents. They sued both HUD and the Blackfeet Tribal Housing Authority (”Housing Authority”) and its board members alleging numerous statutory and contractual violations. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, with the limitations discussed below. We reverse the district court’s dismissal of the claims against the Housing Authority, and affirm dismissal of the claims against HUD. I. Factual Background1 Pursuant to the goals set out in the United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437-1440 (2005), HUD developed the MHHO Program. The MHHO Program was designed to. . .

PREGERSON, Circuit Judge, specially concurring:
I write separately to point out the manifest injustice of releasing the federal government from responsibility in this suit. The relationship between the federal government and the tribes has been one of promises carelessly made and callously broken. Here we see that in the area of tribal housing, as in so many other areas, we as a nation have ignored the collateral consequences of our conduct toward American Indians and have utterly failed to live up to our promises. We have a moral duty, if not a legal duty, to remedy the harm caused to these Plaintiffs. tion jurisdiction and a waiver of sovereign immunity), with A.E. Finley & Assoc. v. United States, 898 F.2d 1165, 1167 (6th Cir. 1990) (”[I]f an action rests within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Claims Court under the Tucker Act . . . the district court does not have jurisdiction regardless of other possible statutory bases.”). The Ninth Circuit has not squarely confronted the particular arguments raised in those two cases, but has generally held that Tucker Act jurisdiction is exclusive. See, e.g., Skokomish Indian Tribe v. United States, 410 F.3d 506, 511 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc); M-S-R Pub. Power Agency v. Bonneville Power Admin., 297 F.3d 833, 840 (9th Cir. 2002); Wilkins v. United States, 279 F.3d 782, 785 (9th Cir. 2002). We see no reason to disturb that conclusion here. Because Tucker Act jurisdiction is exclusive, except where the Little Tucker Act provides concurrent district court jurisdiction, such claims are properly reviewed in the court of claims, not in the federal district courts. . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in BENSON v. LENNON, No. 04-35339, an appeal in a civil action brought by the United States. The panel consisted of Melvin Brunetti, Thomas G. Nelson, and Richard A. Paez, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:
I. Introduction Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we have jurisdiction over appeals from “all final decisions of the district courts of the United States.” This appeal presents the question of whether a district court’s order determining the rights and liabilities of some, but not all, claimants with claims to receivership assets is a final decision under § 1291. We conclude that, unless the district court certifies the order and directs entry of judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), such an order is not a final decision. Thus, we lack jurisdiction over the appeal of one set of claimants/appellants, Benson and Brix, LLC (”Benson and Brix”), but we have jurisdiction over the appeal of the other set, the American Funeral and Cemetery Trust Services, MUDD, and the Mudd Revocable Trust. We address the merits of the second set of claimants’ appeal in a memorandum disposition issued with this opinion. II. Background These consolidated appeals arise from a civil suit against an investment advisor, Capital Consultants, LLC (”CCL”), by the SEC (”the SEC litigation”). The appellants were all clients of CCL and are thus claimants in the SEC litigation. To understand their appeal, one must not only understand the appellants’ position in the SEC litigation, but also in another suit. . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in USA v. INTRIGUE TRADING, No. 04-55354, an appeal in a civil action brought by the United States. The panel consisted of Procter Hug, Jr. and Kim McLane Wardlaw, Circuit Judges, and James K. Singleton, District Judge.

WARDLAW, Circuit Judge:
This appeal and cross-appeal arise from the search and seizure by the United States Customs Service of over 44 million cigarettes, contained in 4,432 mastercases, for nonpayment of California cigarette taxes. The appeals require us to determine . . .