The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an order in INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR KRISHNA CONSCIOUSNESS SO. v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, No. 01-56579, a civil rights appeal. The panel consisted of Harry Pregerson, Stephen S. Trott, and Richard A. Paez, Circuit Judges.

We certify the question set forth in Part II of this order to the California Supreme Court. The answer to the certified question depends upon California law. The California Supreme Court’s answer will be determinative of the appeal presently before us. We find no clear controlling precedent in the decisions of the California Supreme Court. We therefore respectfully request that the California Supreme Court answer 6475 . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in BECK v. CITY OF UPLAND, No. 05-56901, a civil rights appeal. The panel consisted of Marsha S. Berzon and Sandra S. Ikuta, Circuit Judges, and James K. Singleton, District Judge.

BERZON, Circuit Judge:
Kenneth Beck and the City of Upland, California, engaged for months in an escalating series of disputes arising from Beck’s protests against a city contract granted to one of his competitors. In the incident that gave rise to this case, Beck was arrested six days after he confronted two city police officers over what he felt to be unfair treatment by the city. Beck’s arrest was pursuant to a warrant for two felony violations of a California statute prohibiting threats of violence made to deter police officers from performing their duties. The warrant, we conclude — as did the state courts considering the criminal charges — was entirely without probable cause. All charges against Beck were dismissed. Beck maintains that his “First and Fourth Amendment rights . . . were violated when he was arrested and imprisoned [without probable cause] for his protected speech and then forced to incur the cost of defending himself against the crim. . .

IKUTA, Circuit Judge, concurring in part, dissenting in part: In my view, the district court’s grant of summary judgment must be reversed for two reasons. First, the district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismissed Beck’s § 1983 cause of action based in part on its determination that the police officers had probable cause to arrest Beck. This determination was erroneous: the police officers lacked probable cause to arrest Beck as a matter of law. See In re Manuel G., 16 Cal. 4th 805, 814-15 (1997). Second, the district court determined that the officers were immune from liability under Smiddy v. Varney, 665 F.2d 261 (9th Cir. 1981), due to the prosecutor’s intervening action of filing a criminal charge against Beck. The Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006), casts doubt on the district court’s conclusion, at least with respect to Beck’s allegation that the police officers arrested him in retaliation for his exercise of First Amendment rights. Beck had attempted to rebut the Smiddy presumption (i.e., the presumption that a prosecutor’s filing of criminal charges constitutes an exercise of independent judgment that immu. . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an order in EDGERLY v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, No. 05-15080, a civil rights appeal. The panel consisted of William C. Canby, Jr., John T. Noonan, and Richard A. Paez, Circuit Judges.

The petition for panel rehearing is GRANTED. The petition for rehearing with suggestion for rehearing en banc is DENIED as moot. The opinion filed on July 17, 2007 and reported at 495 F.3d 645 (9th Cir. 2007) is WITHDRAWN. The panel will file a new disposition in due course. 5925 . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in LEVINE v. CITY OF ALAMEDA, No. 06-15480, a civil rights appeal. The panel consisted of Procter Hug, Jr., Mary M. Schroeder, and Richard R. Clifton, Circuit Judges.

HUG, Circuit Judge:
Edward Levine filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Alameda (”City”) and James M. Flint, both individually and as City Manager, alleging that the defendants violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. On February 17, 2004, Flint told Levine, a property manager for the City, that he was going to be laid off. Levine wrote Flint a letter in which he requested a pretermination hearing regarding his lay off. Levine believed that the lay off was a pretext and that he was being terminated because Flint disliked him. After receiving the letter, Flint gave it to the City’s Human Resources Director, Karen Willis, and told her to make sure that Levine’s due process rights were respected. Willis then . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in NORTH PACIFICA LLC v. CITY, No. 05-16069, a civil rights appeal. The panel consisted of J. Clifford Wallace, Procter Hug, Jr., and Mary M. Schroeder, Circuit Judges.

SCHROEDER, Circuit Judge:
These appeals arise out of a convoluted series of events illustrating the friction that can grow between a developer trying to secure approval of a condominium project as quickly as possible, and a city trying to use development permit procedures to avoid all foreseeable future problems. The plaintiff-developer is North Pacifica LLC and the defendant is the City of Pacifica. The conduct on the part of both sides has led to moving targets for litigation activity, and the entire project is still tied up in proceedings before the California Coastal Commission. The case presents a remarkable series of ironic twists. The developer originally sued the City for delays in approving its application for development permits, but because of a citizen’s appeal to the Coastal Commission, the development is still on hold, long after City approval. The district court awarded damages to the developer, not on the basis of any harm alleged in its original complaint, but because of a condition in the permit to which the developer never voiced any objection in the hearing before the City Council. The condition in question was inserted by outside counsel the City hired in order to avoid litigation, and the condition has, of course, had the opposite result. Finally, the district court correctly dismissed the substantive due process claim in the original complaint, but for the wrong reason, incorrectly treating it as a takings claim that required exhaustion of state court remedies, rather than as a substantive due process claim for delays that, contrary to the complaint’s allegations, were not unreasonable. See N. Pacifica, LLC v. City of Pacifica, 234 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1064-66 (N.D. Cal. 2002). The disputes before us boil down to first, the developer’s contentions that we should resurrect its substantive due process claim and that we should remand for the award of addi. . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in JACOBS v. CLARK COUNTY, No. 05-16434, a civil rights appeal. The panel consisted of Michael Daly Hawkins, Sidney R. Thomas, and Richard R. Clifton, Circuit Judges.

HAWKINS, Circuit Judge:
Public school districts across the country have increasingly turned to the adoption of mandatory dress policies, sometimes referred to as “school uniform policies,” in an effort to focus student attention and reduce conflict. These policies are not without controversy, and many students, as well as their parents, find them offensive to their understanding of core First Amendment values. In a case of first impression in this circuit, we address just such a set of challenges and largely conclude that public school mandatory dress policies survive constitutional scrutiny. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL HISTORY In 2003, the Clark County School District (”the District”) promulgated Regulation 5131 (”the Regulation”), which created a standard dress code for all Clark County students and established a means by which individual schools in the District could establish more stringent mandatory school uniform policies. These uniform policies were to be established “for. . .

THOMAS, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
Kim Jacobs wanted to wear a T-shirt to Liberty High School containing a message expressing her religious beliefs as a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. When she did, she was suspended four times, for a total of twenty-five days, because the only messages allowed on shirts were those promoting the school. She alleges that she was penalized academically, suffered emotional harm, and eventually was forced to transfer to another school. . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in TAYLOR v. WESTLY, No. 07-16902, a civil rights appeal. The panel consisted of Robert R. Beezer, Andrew J. Kleinfeld, and Michael Daly Hawkins, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:
This controversy has been the subject of extensive litigation in the district court and has generated two prior appeals. In both the prior appeals, plaintiffs prevailed. In the first appeal, we determined that the State of California did not have the sovereign immunity that it claimed. See Taylor v. Westly (Taylor I), 402 F.3d 924, 936 (9th Cir. 2005). In the second appeal, we concluded that the State’s procedures for protecting the rights of owners of property in its escheat process were unconstitutional. See Taylor v. Westly (Taylor II), 488 F.3d 1197, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 2007). We required the district court to enjoin operation of the California escheat process and suggested that the district court require court approval of curative regulations. See id. at 1202. . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in REUSSER v. WACHOVIA BANK, N. A., No. 06-35850, a civil rights appeal. The panel consisted of Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Susan P. Graber, and Consuelo M. Callahan, Circuit Judges.

O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge:
We must decide whether alleged fraud in a state court home foreclosure proceeding during the homeowners’ bankruptcy can be re-visited in federal court. I A In December 2001, Kenneth and Gertrude Reusser received an $860,000 loan from Long Beach Mortgage Company, placing as collateral a home that had been in Kenneth’s family for more than 100 years. Five months after receiving the loan, the Reussers stopped making payments. In April 2003, Long Beach Mortgage Company assigned its interest to Wachovia Bank, which gave notice to the Reussers that it intended to foreclose on the property through Washington Mutual Bank, its loan servicing institution. . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in Torresl v. City of Madera,, No. 05-16762, a civil rights appeal. The panel consisted of Betty B. Fletcher, Eugene E. Siler, Jr., and Michael Daly Hawkins, Circuit Judges.

HAWKINS, Circuit Judge:
In this interlocutory appeal, we face an issue remarkably similar on its facts to that faced by the Fourth Circuit in Henry v. Purnell, 501 F.3d 374 (4th Cir. 2007). There, a deputy sheriff, intending to deploy a Taser device holstered near his firearm, instead drew and fired his service weapon, wounding a suspect fleeing arrest. Here, Madera City Police Officer Marcy Noriega (”Officer Noreiga”) made the same mistake with even more tragic consequences: she shot and killed Everardo Torres (”Everardo”), an arrestee sitting handcuffed in the back of a patrol car. We conclude that Everardo was seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and further conclude, as did our sister circuit, that the officer’s mistake is governed by Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis. Facts and Procedural History In the process of responding to a loud music complaint, Madera City Police officers arrested two individuals–Erica Mejia and Everardo Torres–handcuffed them, and placed them in the back of a patrol car. After the two were in the patrol car for approximately thirty to forty-five minutes (during which time Everardo had fallen asleep), Mejia was removed from the car and her handcuffs were readjusted. At this time, Everardo awoke and started yelling and began kicking the back window of the patrol car. In response, Officer Noriega approached Everardo’s side of the patrol car. At least one witness saw Officer Noriega say something as she approached, which Officer Noriega described as “yelling at [Everardo] to stop or he was going to be tased.” Officer Noriega then opened the patrol car door and reached down with her right hand to her right side, where she had a Glock semiautomatic pistol in a holster in her officer belt and, immediately below, a Taser M26 stun gun in a thigh holster. . . .

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in GREGORY v. COUNTY OF MAUI, No. 06-15374, a civil rights appeal. The panel consisted of Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, A. Wallace Tashima, and Milan D. Smith, Jr., Circuit Judges.

O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge:
We must decide whether police officers used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment in attempting to restrain an individual. I A On December 2, 2002, Richard Gregory and a friend were guests in a music studio operated by Vincent Finazzo and Jason Fuqua in Lahaina, Maui, Hawaii. Finazzo and Fuqua were playing music and working on new songs, and they eventually decided to leave the studio and asked Gregory to do the same. Gregory, however, had taken interest in a guitar he found and insisted on staying. An exchange soon became heated, as Gregory took on an increasingly pugnacious tone and posture, telling Finazzo, “Don’t make me hit you.” When Finazzo tried to call a friend of Gregory’s to calm him down, Gregory threw Finazzo’s cell phone to the ground. Gregory began to pace around the room, stating that “we’re all going . . .