Archive for the 'Diversity' Category

BLAZEVSKA v. RAYTHEON AIRCRAFT

Thursday, April 10th, 2008

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in BLAZEVSKA v. RAYTHEON AIRCRAFT, No. 06-16028, a diversity appeal. The panel consisted of Dorothy W. Nelson and Michael Daly Hawkins, Circuit Judges, and Robert J. Timlin, Senior Judge.

D.W. NELSON, Senior Circuit Judge:
Slobodanka Blazevska and her co-appellants are the family members of eight Macedonian residents who died in a plane accident in Bosnia on February 26, 2004. The decedents, including the Macedonian president, were killed when their Beechcraft Super King Air 200 crashed into a hilltop. The plaintiffs brought a wrongful death action against Raytheon, the manufacturer of the plane. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, holding that plaintiffs’ action was barred by the eighteen-year statute of repose in the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (”GARA”). Pub. L. No. 103 298, 108 Stat. 1552 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 notes). The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the presumption against extraterritoriality precludes GARA’s application in this case. We affirm the order of the district court granting summary judgment for appellee Raytheon. The presumption against extraterritoriality is not implicated in this case, so GARA bars appellants’ suit. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In early 1980, appellee Raytheon Aircraft Company (”Raytheon”) manufactured a Beech Super King Air 200 Aircraft in Wichita, Kansas. Around April 4, 1980, Raytheon sold the aircraft to “The Beechcraft Organization for Central Europe.” Later that month, the aircraft was delivered to the Republic of Macedonia, which retained ownership of the plane until its eventual destruction. On February 26, 2004, the aircraft departed Skopje, Macedonia, bound for Mostar, Bosnia, with the President of Mace. . .

PERRETTA v. PROMETHEUS DEVELOP

Thursday, March 27th, 2008

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in PERRETTA v. PROMETHEUS DEVELOP, No. 06-15526, a diversity appeal. The panel consisted of David R. Thompson and Milan D. Smith, Jr., Circuit Judges, and William Q. Hayes, District Judge.

MILAN D. SMITH, JR., Circuit Judge:
This action for breach of fiduciary duty requires us to decide what vote of the limited partners of a California limited partnership is necessary to ratify a self-interested transaction proposed by the partnership’s general partner. We hold that only the partnership agreement may vary the unanimous ratification requirement of California law, and that it would be “manifestly unreasonable” for a partnership agreement to include votes cast by an interested general partner or its affiliates in a ratification vote. We reverse the decision of the district court. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Prometheus Income Partners, LP (Partnership) was a California limited partnership, organized to manage two large apartment complexes in Santa Clara, California. Its general partner was Defendant-Appellee Prometheus Development Co., Inc. (PDC), a California corporation. PDC is 100%owned by the DNS Trust, a trust effectively controlled by Defendant-Appellee Sanford N. Diller (Diller), who is also PDC’s sole director, President, and CFO. PlaintiffsAppellants Louis and Frank Perretta (Plaintiffs) were limited. . .

PROGRESSIVE CASUALTY v. OWEN

Wednesday, March 26th, 2008

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in PROGRESSIVE CASUALTY v. OWEN, No. 06-35677, a diversity appeal. The panel consisted of M. Margaret McKeown and Richard R. Clifton, Circuit Judges, and William W Schwarzer, District Judge.

SCHWARZER, District Judge: Progressive Casualty Insurance Company (”Progressive”) appeals the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Arlene Owen (”Arlene”) and its denial of summary judgment in favor of Progressive. Progressive argues that the district court improperly rewrote an insurance policy issued to Owen Trucking to include Arlene as a named insured. Progressive also argues that the district court erred in denying Progressive’s summary judgment motion because Arlene was not occupying an insured auto at the time of her accident. We agree, and we therefore reverse the judgment of the district court. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Arlene is the former vice-president, secretary, and director of Owen Trucking, a corporation whose sole shareholders were Arlene and her ex-husband, Curtis Owen (”Curtis”). Owen Trucking was in the business of hauling talc from talc mines. Arlene worked at Owen Trucking for two to four hours per week doing office work. Progressive issued a commercial auto insurance policy to Owen Trucking for twelve of its vehicles. The declarations pages, which are expressly made part of the policy, listed the named insured as “BENNETT OWENTRUCKING I.” The declarations also listed ten drivers, not including Arlene. Arlene’s name does not appear on the declarations pages or anywhere else in the policy. The policy was silent regarding coverage for officers, directors, owners, or employees. . . .

MANZAREK v. ST. PAUL FIRE

Tuesday, March 25th, 2008

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in MANZAREK v. ST. PAUL FIRE, No. 06-55936, a diversity appeal. The panel consisted of Alfred T. Goodwin, Betty B. Fletcher, and N. Randy Smith, Circuit Judges.

N.R. Smith, Circuit Judge:
We hold that the district court erred by dismissing Raymond Manzarek’s and Doors Touring, Inc.’s (”DTI”) amended complaint because the underlying complaints raised at least the potential for coverage under the operative insurance policies. We further hold that the district court abused its discretion by not giving Manzarek and DTI an opportunity to amend their complaint. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. I. Background A. Underlying Lawsuits This insurance coverage and bad faith lawsuit arose out of two lawsuits (”Underlying Lawsuits”) filed in California state court against Manzarek (a founding member of the classic rock group The Doors), DTI, and the other members of Manzarek’s band at the time of the filing of the lawsuits. John Densmore (the former drummer for The Doors) filed one of the Underlying Lawsuits (”Densmore Lawsuit”). The parents of Jim Morrison (the former vocalist for The Doors) and the parents of Pamela Courson (Morrison’s late wife) together filed the other underlying lawsuit (”Courson Lawsuit”). Both Underlying Lawsuits alleged that Manzarek and members of . . .

JAMES RIVER INSURANCE COMPANY v. HERBERT SCHENK, P.C.

Tuesday, March 18th, 2008

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in JAMES RIVER INSURANCE COMPANY v. HERBERT SCHENK, P.C., No. 06-15622, a diversity appeal. The panel consisted of William C. Canby, Jr., David R. Thompson, and Milan D. Smith, Jr., Circuit Judges.

MILAN D. SMITH, JR., Circuit Judge:
In this appeal we decide whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment to a professional liability insurer on a claim seeking a declaration of no coverage, and on counterclaims for breach of contract and bad faith under Arizona law. The insurer argued that it could permissibly refuse to provide for its insured’s defense against a legal malpractice lawsuit because the insured failed to mention the possibility of the lawsuit in the insurance application. The district court agreed and held that Arizona Revised Statutes § 20-1109 permits a denial of coverage because the insured’s omission constitutes legal fraud. The court rejected the counterclaims because the insurer provided for the malpractice defense. We reverse and remand for trial. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND David and Cheryl Nolan and Tony and Shirley Wall formed a limited liability company in 2000 for the purpose of . . .

BROWN & BAIN, P.A. v. O’QUINN

Thursday, March 6th, 2008

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in BROWN & BAIN, P.A. v. O’QUINN, No. 06-15931, a diversity appeal. The panel consisted of John T. Noonan, Sidney R. Thomas, and Jay S. Bybee, Circuit Judges.

NOONAN, Circuit Judge:
Brown & Bain, P.A. (Brown & Bain), a Phoenix law firm, sued John M. O’Quinn, et al. (O’Quinn), a Houston law firm, for fees owed to it on the termination of a lawsuit. The district court gave judgment for Brown & Bain. O’Quinn appeals. The case is not without interest for the professional responsibility of lawyers inter se. We affirm the judgment of the district court. FACTS In 1991, approximately nine hundred claimants in the Phoenix area joined in a suit against Motorola alleging damages of over $100 million from environmental contamination. The law firm bringing the action dissolved. In 1993, O’Quinn took on the representation of most of the claimants (the McIntire Plaintiffs). Per contract with O’Quinn, each plaintiff agreed that O’Quinn would be paid a contingent fee of 40% “of the total sums or fair market value of property collected or received from trial or settlement of Client’s claims.” Each client was to receive 60% “of the total recovery or settlement, less the costs and expenses of litigation.” The client agreed that “all court costs and expenses of litigation Attorneys have paid or incurred” should be “reimbursed out of Client’s 60% share of the Total Recovery by settlement or otherwise.” For . . .

TUCKER v. KENNER

Friday, February 8th, 2008

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in TUCKER v. KENNER, No. 05-56045, a diversity appeal. The panel consisted of John T. Noonan, Richard A. Paez, and Richard C. Tallman, Circuit Judges.

PAEZ, Circuit Judge:
In these consolidated malicious prosecution cases, William Tucker and the Estate of Cynthia Dolores Tucker (”the Tuckers”), appeal the district court’s grant of summary judgment to all defendants in both cases. In Tucker v. Interscope, we affirm the district court’s ruling as to all defendants. In Tucker v. Kenner, we affirm the district court’s summary judgment as to defendant Thomas; however, as to defendant Kenner we affirm the district court’s ruling in part and reverse in part, and remand for trial. We also affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to Mr. Tucker’s loss of consortium claim in both cases. I. Overview In the early 1990s, Cynthia DeLores Tucker, whose history as an activist dates back to the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s, became concerned with the increasing popularity of the style of hip-hop music known as “gangsta rap,” particularly its appeal to African-American youth. She enlisted the support of notable entertainers including Dionne Warwick and Melba Moore to engage in lobbying and media outreach, with the goal of limiting the sale of gangsta rap to young people. Her efforts brought her head-to-head with two of the genre’s most successful production and distribution. . .

NOONAN, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting:
The legal question to be decided is whether Tucker presented sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of material fact as to whether Death Row and Kenner had sued her with malice when they began and continued a suit against her charging her with racketeering involving extortion, mail and . . .

BANK OF NEW YORK v. FREMONT GENERAL CORP.

Friday, February 1st, 2008

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in BANK OF NEW YORK v. FREMONT GENERAL CORP., No. 05-56653, a diversity appeal. The panel consisted of Alex Kozinski, Chief Judge, Andrew J. Kleinfeld and Richard C. Tallman, Circuit Judges.

TALLMAN, Circuit Judge:
This case arises from a commercial bank deposit contract . . .

CORNHUSKER CASUALTY v. SAMPLES

Wednesday, January 30th, 2008

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an order in CORNHUSKER CASUALTY v. SAMPLES, No. 06-35106, a diversity appeal. The panel consisted of Ronald M. Gould and Richard A. Paez, Circuit Judges, and Lyle E. Strom, District Judge.

GOULD, Circuit Judge:
This case arises from a dispute over whether Cornhusker Casualty Insurance Company (”Cornhusker”) insured Rockeries, Inc. (”Rockeries”), a Washington landscaping company, on October 22, 2004, the day Leanne Samples was fatally injured in an automobile accident with an employee of Rockeries. Brooks Samples, Leanne’s husband and the administrator of her estate, brought a wrongful death action against Rockeries and its owners in Washington state court. Cornhusker then brought suit in federal district court against Rockeries and Samples seeking a declaratory judgment that, prior to the accident, it had effectively cancelled its policy insuring Rockeries because of nonpayment of premiums. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Cornhusker and denied Samples’ cross-motion for summary judgment. Samples appealed the district court’s decision. We had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. In an opinion filed concurrently with this order, we rejected Cornhusker’s waiver argument and Samples’ equitable estoppel claim. This order certifies to the Washington State Supreme Court the remaining and dispositive question of state law before us–namely, whether notice. . .

CORNHUSKERS CASUALTY v. SAMPLES

Wednesday, January 30th, 2008

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals today released an opinion in CORNHUSKERS CASUALTY v. SAMPLES, No. 06-35106, a diversity appeal. The panel consisted of Ronald M. Gould and Richard A. Paez, Circuit Judges, and Lyle E. Strom, District Judge.

GOULD, Circuit Judge:
Brooks Samples (”Samples”) appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Cornhusker Casualty Insurance Company (”Cornhusker”) and denial of Samples’ cross-motion for summary judgment in Cornhusker’s declaratory judgment action. The district court held that Cornhusker, before the accident that resulted in the death of Samples’ wife, effectively cancelled its policy insuring the company responsible for her fatal injuries. The crux of the district court’s holding is its determination that certified mail satisfies the notice requirement for cancellation of an insurance policy under the Revised Code of Washington (”RCW”) § 48.18.290. Samples challenges this conclusion and also argues that Cornhusker, because it informed the insured that it would collect the premium in a quarterly payment plan, is estopped from denying coverage under its insurance policy when the insured paid its last installment less than three months after the previous payment. Cornhusker, in addition to endorsing the district court’s statutory interpretation, contends that Samples waived his right to argue that certified mail, unlike regular mail, must actually be delivered in order to satisfy the notice requirement of RCW § 48.18.290 because he did not raise the issue before the district court. We have juris. . .